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1 Introduction
Altruism is widely defined as a concern for the well-being of others. This definition appears to be
self-explanatory and to lend itself easily to economic modeling. Yet, any attempt at representing
altruistic preferences by means of a utility function seems to prove the opposite. In a seminal
paper, Andreoni and Miller (2002) showed that giving in the dictator game is well-captured by
simple CES preferences—over the payoff pair of “dictator” and “recipient”—while subsequent
research showed that no such utility function is compatible with giving in extensions of the basic
dictator game that more realistically capture social interactions outside laboratories. For example,
if we allow the recipient to have income of her own, giving is crowded out only imperfectly
(Bolton and Katok, 1998), suggesting that warm glow may additionally affect giving (Korenok
et al., 2013). Furthermore, if we allow the dictator to take from the recipient’s endowment (List,
2007; Bardsley, 2008), we observe asymmetries between giving and taking, suggesting that the
warm glow of giving is weaker than the cold prickle of taking (Korenok et al., 2014), a result that
is incompatible with related evidence from public goods games. Or, if we allow subjects to sort out
of playing a dictator game (Dana et al., 2006), around half of them do so, in particular those who
otherwise would give much to the recipient (Lazear et al., 2012), suggesting that we may need to
distinguish between altruistic givers and social-pressure givers (DellaVigna et al., 2012). Overall,
depending on how we extend the clinical dictator game, a different model of giving seems to be
required. In turn, we currently cannot say that we have a reliable model of the simplest economic
activity, giving, or a reliable representation of the simplest social preference, altruism. Since any
economic interaction involves giving, this raises a fundamental question: Do neither giving nor the
underlying preferences lend themselves to (rigorous) economic modeling, and if so, what does?
Our paper presents an axiomatic approach to modeling giving that allows us to directly ad-
dress this potential impossibility. The advantage of an axiomatic approach is that it provides a
positive result, characterizing the family of utility functions that represent all forms of interdepen-
dent preferences under “plausible” assumptions (i.e., axioms). This clarifies the set of candidate
models, many of which may not have been “invented” so far, and avoids the difficulties inherent
in constructing a model based on evidence from a selected range of experiments—that the con-
structed model may be just one of many candidates. We show that in addition to the standard
axioms completeness, transitivity, and continuity, three simple assumptions, namely separability,
narrow bracketing, and scaling invariance, refine the vast set of candidate models surprisingly con-
cisely to models where altruism represents a concern for the welfare of others. Individuals max-
imize a weighted mean of “individual welfare functions” equivalent to the reference-dependent
value functions known from prospect theory. We use the term “individual welfare function” to
refer to an individual’s utility in one-person decision problems. Our representation result (Propo-
sition 1) establishes that this individual welfare is the yardstick by which a person evaluates the
consequences of her actions on others, which provides a formal foundation for the general un-
derstanding of altruism. In the one-player case, our model reduces to prospect-theoretic utilities,
implying that it is compatible with the range of evidence on choice under risk. This stands in con-
trast to current models of altruism, all of which represent altruism as concerns for payoffs rather
than welfares.1
1An early proposal of Becker (1974) treats altruism as a concern for the utility of others, which yields a linear equation
system that can be solved to represent altruism again as a concern for payoffs of others. The resulting differences to
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The theoretical predictions of welfare-based altruism applied to giving show how the model
organizes the seemingly inconsistent behavior in laboratory experiments. We demonstrate this
explicitly for the large family of generalized dictator games. A dictator’s optimal transfer at an
interior solution decreases in her own reference point while it increases in the recipient’s reference
point. This explains how a reallocation of initial endowments affects the optimal transfer, by
shifting the players’ reference points, and predicts imperfect crowding out. Another feature central
to welfare-based altruism is that the resulting preferences are not convex, as individual welfares are
S-shaped. Non-convexity directly explains that allowing the dictator to take from the recipient’s
initial endowment may result in “preference reversals”; this means that a dictator whose optimal
choice in a game without the possibility to take is to transfer a positive amount to the recipient may
switch to taking from the recipient once this is allowed (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008). Relatedly,
losses in relation to the reference point loom larger than gains, akin to loss aversion, explaining
the asymmetries between giving and taking (Korenok et al., 2014). Welfare-based altruism also
predicts the existence of “reluctant sharers”, i.e. persons who transfer a positive amount to the
recipient in a standard dictator game but choose a costly option to sort out of the game when given
the chance (Dana et al., 2006; Lazear et al., 2012). Since the recipient never learns about the game
if the dictator sorts out, her reference point is not adjusted to the dictator game environment in this
case and her welfare remains neutral. Once the dictator enters the game, the recipient is informed
about the scope of the interaction and forms a reference point reflecting her expectations, which
inflicts a negative externality on a welfare-based altruist. If the dictator believes the recipient
would form high expectations once informed, she is best off sorting out and leaving the recipient
uninformed. It is worth noting that these predictions are explicit, i.e. the opposite results are ruled
out by welfare-based altruism (in a sense made precise in Proposition 2).
After establishing these theoretical predictions, we comprehensively evaluate whether welfare-
based altruism indeed captures behavior across giving, sorting, and taking decisions in a quantita-
tively useful manner—as opposed to overfitting observations due to the additional degrees of free-
dom (the reference points). To this end, we rely on data from controlled laboratory experiments,
which allow us to test models very directly, but as reviewed below, the phenomena observed in
the field are very similar. Further, potential concerns about overfitting apply equally to all mod-
els, in particular to all behavioral models generalizing the so-called standard models, regardless
of whether they are models of choice, probability weighting, strategic beliefs, learning, or social
preferences. Yet, outside the context of choice under risk (Harless et al., 1994; Wilcox, 2008; Hey
et al., 2010), analyses testing the robustness and thus the “applicability” of models are rare, espe-
cially considering the sizes of the respective literatures.2 Occasionally, this seems to be taken as a
suggestion that behavioral models may lack robustness, in particular models of social preferences,
which we seek to directly address by a comprehensive analysis of model adequacy.
We first estimate the distributions of individual reference points in the four types of dictator
game experiments: standard games, games with generalized endowments, with taking options, and
with sorting options. The estimated distributions are surprisingly consistent and generally we find
three clusters resembling the non-givers, altruistic givers, and social-pressure givers observed by
standard models in games of complete information are negligible (Kritikos and Bolle, 2005).
2The short list of exceptions that we are aware of comprises analyses of learning (Camerer and Ho, 1999), strategic
choice in normal-form games (Camerer et al., 2004), stochastic choice in dictator games (Breitmoser, 2013, 2017), and
bargaining preferences (De Bruyn and Bolton, 2008).
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DellaVigna et al. (2012) in charitable fundraising. Implicitly, this clarifies how the diversity of
types is captured in a formally uniform manner by welfare-based altruism.
Next, we re-analyze behavior across a set of nine well-known laboratory experiments on
giving, comprising 83 choice conditions and around 6500 decisions from 981 subjects. We ex-
amine robustness of the in-sample fit within each set of conditions (“descriptive adequacy”) and,
more importantly, we analyze robustness across conditions (“predictive adequacy”) by predicting
behavior based on observations from one set of conditions in another set of conditions—asking:
Is giving indeed inconsistent across conditions? We find that it is not. Predictions improve sub-
stantially by allowing for reference dependence in altruism, as implied by welfare-based altruism,
and consistently so across all combinations of in- and out-of-sample conditions. As robustness
check, we examine two alternative approaches of extending the standard CES model of altruism,
by capturing either warm glow and cold prickle, or envy and guilt, which both fail to improve
on CES altruism reliably (i.e. out-of-sample). Hence, the theoretically predicted reference depen-
dence substantively adds to the understanding of behavior and the improved model fit is not due
to the additional degrees of freedom per se. We conclude that reference dependence, and the im-
plied non-convexity of preferences, appears to be a stable behavioral trait affecting giving across
conditions.
Finally, we use our estimates to predict (again out-of-sample) “social appropriateness” of
actions in dictator, taking and sorting games as examined by Krupka and Weber (2013). Their
results suggest that behavior may be norm-guided rather than payoff or welfare concerned, casting
general doubts on the applicability of models (such as ours) proposed in the existing literature.
We show that the “social appropriateness” they elicit via coordination games strongly correlates
with the Rawlsian notion of social welfare implied by our predictions of each player’s individual
welfare. That is, we show that social appropriateness seems to have a simple and intuitive Rawlsian
foundation in individual welfare—which we interpret to lend further credibility to both, welfare-
based altruism and social appropriateness, as dual approaches towards analyzing behavior.
In conjunction, our results suggest that understanding interdependence of preferences as
concerns for the welfare of others is indeed an instrumental approach to explain and model giving.
Since any economic interaction is a form of bi- or multilateral giving, and welfare-based altruism is
based on general axioms not related to unilateral giving, there are a number of theoretical and prac-
tical implications. The axiomatic analysis establishes an interdependence of concepts as diverse
as prospect theory, narrow bracketing, altruism, social appropriateness, and reference dependence,
and it predicts a range of behavioral puzzles that survived for about 20 years of experimental re-
search. This underlines the power of axiomatic analyses also in the context of social preferences.
Further, our results imply that decision makers are utilitarists (for recent discussions, see Fleur-
baey and Maniquet, 2011, and Piacquadio, 2017) but in a manner that was predicted by Rawls:
rational agents “do not take an interest in one another’s interests” (Rawls, 1971, p. 13). That is,
agents are concerned with the welfare of others in the way that these others would perceive it in
one-person decision problems, but they are not concerned with their altruism or envy, for example.
This in turn provides a normative argument for “preference laundering” (Goodin, 1986) in behav-
ioral analyses of social welfare, i.e. for the neglect of emotions such as altruism or envy in welfare
analyses. Finally, by generalizing prospect-theoretic utility, welfare-based altruism addresses a
number of practical concerns in the literature, such as providing a unified framework for measur-
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ing robustness and heterogeneity of preferences across populations and decision problems (Falk
et al., 2017), providing a normatively founded framework for measuring reference points across
interactions, thereby facilitating a solution to the long-lasting debate on whether and when refer-
ence points reflect a status quo (Kahneman et al., 1991), expectations (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006),
or others’ payoffs (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and providing a general framework for structural
analyses of charitable giving (DellaVigna et al., 2012; Huck et al., 2015).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related literature on giving.
Section 3 provides our representation result (Proposition 1) and discusses its relation to the liter-
ature. Section 4 analyzes the implications for giving theoretically in relation to the stylized facts
reviewed in Section 2 (Propositions 2 and 3). Section 5 evaluates welfare-based altruism econo-
metrically by a range of in-sample and out-of-sample analyses. Section 6 concludes. The appendix
contains relegated definitions, proofs, and robustness checks.
2 Related literature: Experimental evidence on giving
The dictator game is widely used to study giving. We are analyzing the class of generalized
dictator games under complete information. In each game, there are two players, the dictator and
the recipient. Player 1 (dictator) is endowed with B1 tokens and player 2 (recipient) is endowed
with B2 tokens. Player 1 can choose p1 ∈ P1 ⊂ R, inducing a payoff of p1 for herself and a payoff
of p2(p1) = t(B1 +B2 − p1) for player 2. We refer to t > 0 as transfer rate, to B = B1 +B2 as





Definition 1 (Generalized dictator game). A generalized dictator game Γ is defined by the tuple
〈B1,B2,P1, t〉. The following variants will be distinguished.
• Standard dictator game: B1 > 0, B2 = 0, P1 ⊆ [0,B1]
• Generalized endowments: B1 ≥ 0, B2 > 0, P1 ⊆ [0,B1]
• Taking game: B1 ≥ 0, B2 > 0, P1 ⊆ [0,B1 +B2]
• Sorting game: B1 > 0, B2 = 0, P1 ⊆ {[0,B1], p̃1} where p̃1 is an outside option for player
1 inducing payoffs ( p̃1,0), with p̃1 ≤ B1, and implying that 2 is not informed about 1’s
choice or the rules of the game.
Table 1 provides an overview of giving as observed in generalized dictator games. Following
the early work of Kahneman et al. (1986) and for example Hoffman et al. (1996), comprehensive
analyses of behavior in the standard dictator game are presented in Andreoni and Miller (2002) and
Fisman et al. (2007). The average share of the budget transferred by dictators varies between 20%
and 30%, there is an accumulation of transfers at zero and at the payoff-equalizing option, and
there is considerable heterogeneity in transfers between subjects. Varying budget sets B and trans-
fer rates t, observed transfers to a large extent satisfy the generalized axiom of revealed preference,
implying that dictator behavior is consistent with well-behaved preference orderings. As a candi-
date for a utility function representing these preferences, Andreoni and Miller (2002) proposed the
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Table 1: Stylized facts about giving in generalized dictator games
Comparative statics in t The transfer can be either constant, increasing, or decreasing in
the transfer rate.
Taking options reduce giv-
ing at the extensive and in-
tensive margin
Holding endowments constant, extending the choice set of the
dictator to the taking domain transforms some initial givers into
takers and reduces average amounts given.
Incomplete
crowding out
Reallocating endowment from the dictator to the recipient while
holding the overall budget constant leads to a less than one-to-
one reduction in the dictator’s transfer.
Reluctant sharers A substantial share of givers in the standard dictator game
choose to sort out of the game when given the opportunity.
Outside option
attractiveness
As the outside option becomes less attractive, fewer dictators
sort out of the game, where nonsharers sort back in first followed
by the least generous sharers and successively more and more
generous sharers.






with α,β ∈R. Here, α represents the degree of altruism, β = 1 implies efficiency concerns, β → 0
yields Cobb-Douglas utilities, and β →−∞ implies equity concerns (Leontief preferences).
Comparative statics in t In a meta-analysis of about 100 experiments, Engel (2011) shows that
dictators’ transfers increase in the transfer rate, i.e. as transfers become more efficient. This has
been observed earlier by Andreoni and Miller (2002) but, for example, not by Fisman et al. (2007).
The individual level analyses of Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman et al. (2007) suggest that
this inconsistency may be due to differences in subject heterogeneity. In both studies, the majority
of subjects act consistently with CES altruism and can be weakly categorized into three standard
cases of this utility function, namely selfish, perfect substitutes, and Leontief. Perfectly selfish
preferences imply no reaction to changes in the transfer rate, but dictators increase transfers after
increases of t if they consider the payoffs to be imperfect substitutes (β > 0), and they decrease
transfers if they consider payoffs to be imperfect complements (β < 0). Differing shares of the
three types in the population may therefore yield differences in the comparative statics in the
transfer rate.
Taking options reduce giving at the extensive and intensive margin Holding initial endow-
ments constant, convexity of preferences implies that the extension of the dictator’s option set to
negative transfers does not affect the choice of a dictator unless she chooses the boundary solution
of giving nothing in a standard dictator game. This strong prediction is implied by most models of
giving, including CES altruism for β < 1, but falsified by a strand of studies on so-called taking
games (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008). Both List and Bardsley found that introducing options to take
reduces the share of dictators who give positive amounts, though not always significantly. Fur-
thermore, it reduces average amounts given by those who do give positive amounts, and leads to
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substantive accumulation at the most selfish option. Korenok et al. (2014) confirm these results.
List (2007) and Cappelen et al. (2013b) obtain related results on real-effort versions of taking
games. List (2007) and Bardsley (2008) interpret the observed patterns in taking games as an in-
dication that choice is menu dependent and, for example, Korenok et al. (2014) argue that taking
might induce cold prickle in the sense of Andreoni (1995). Note that we in contrast argue that the
initial assumption of convexity may be violated, as known, for example, from choice under risk.
Incomplete crowding out Reference independence of social preferences, as in CES altruism,
implies the so-called crowding out hypothesis (Bolton and Katok, 1998): lump-sum transfers from
dictator to recipient result in a dollar-for-dollar reduction in voluntary giving. The experimen-
tal results on dictator games with generalized endowments unanimously falsify this prediction.
In both lab and field experiments, dictators reduce their transfers in response to reallocations of
endowments to the recipient, but the observed reduction is significantly lower than predicted, a
phenomenon referred to as incomplete crowding out (Bolton and Katok, 1998; Eckel et al., 2005;
Korenok et al., 2012, 2013). These findings extend to the domain of taking games (Korenok et al.,
2014) and to interactions where the budgets are not windfall but generated through either invest-
ment games or real effort tasks (Konow, 2000; Cappelen et al., 2007, 2010, 2013a; Almås et al.,
2010; Ruffle, 1998; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008; Jakiela, 2011, 2015). The evidence on dictator
games with endowments generated in real effort tasks further suggests that the origin of initital en-
dowments affects dictator behavior. Compared to a standard dictator game with windfall budget,
the change to real effort budgets earned by the dictators themselves leads to a drastic reduction in
the proportion of nonzero transfers (Cherry, 2001; Cherry et al., 2002; Cherry and Shogren, 2008;
Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008; Jakiela, 2011, 2015; Hoffman et al., 1994). Cappelen et al. (2007)
relate the observed endowment effects to social norms and, for example, Korenok et al. (2013)
interpret the endowment effects as a sign that warm glow in the sense of Andreoni (1995) affects
giving. Outside the literature on social preferences, endowment effects are mostly related to refer-
ence dependence of preferences (Kahneman et al., 1991; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991), which in
turn will be predicted by our representation result.
Reluctant sharers & outside option attractiveness Turning to sorting games, convexity of
preferences implies that a dictator cannot be strictly better off by opting out than by staying in.
For, the dictator game offers a budget that is at least as high as the outside option. Convexity also
implies that no dictator who transfers a positive amount in the dictator game will opt out, since for
such a dictator the outside option must be strictly worse than the allocation she chose in the dictator
game. Falsifying this prediction, Dana et al. (2006), Broberg et al. (2007), and Lazear et al. (2012)
find that a substantive share (20− 60%) of their subjects in sorting games can be classified as
reluctant sharers, i.e. as dictators who transfer a positive amount in the standard dictator game but
given the opportunity rather opt out. As a result, the average amount shared significantly decreases
when a sorting option is added to the standard dictator game. Lazear et al. (2012) also find that
(i) making the outside option less attractive while holding the dictator game budget constant does
reduce the number of dictators who opt out, but (ii) it also reduces the average amount shared. For,
mostly nonsharers and reluctant sharers who share less generously in the dictator game reenter
first when opting out becomes less attractive. DellaVigna et al. (2012) and Andreoni et al. (2017)
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obtain similar results in field experiments on charitable giving. Related to that, Cappelen et al.
(2017) observe a close interaction between the information the recipient receives about the origin
of her payment and the transfers made by the dictators (in standard dictator games).
There are again multiple proposals for capturing sorting theoretically. DellaVigna et al.
(2012) suggest to model it by allowing for an aversion to “saying no” when asked about donations,
which however does not capture the comparative statics observed by Lazear et al. (2012), while
for example Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) and Ariely et al. (2009) propose to capture reluctancy
by including image concerns. As indicated above, the falsified predictions are closely related to
convexity, implying that non-convexity directly predicts reluctancy and sorting decisions.
Other extensions Other interesting variations of the standard dictator game include for example
the usage of double blind procedures (e.g. Hoffman et al., 1996), extensions to risky environments
(e.g. Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2010; Brock et al., 2013), and variations in the transparency of the
relationship between dictator choices and outcomes (e.g. Dana et al., 2007). We do not discuss
those in more detail here, as these studies have not been designed to primarily study the shape of
social preferences, the scope of the present paper, but rather to study the shape of preferences in
relation to uncertainty and transparency.
3 Payoff-based and welfare-based altruism: Foundation
Which family of utility functions represents the possible range of altruistic preferences under gen-
eral behavioral assumptions? Or put differently, which utility functions may be considered plausi-
ble candidates in the first place? Despite the plethora of studies on altruism, we are not aware of
one addressing or answering these elementary questions. The axiomatic foundations of inequity
aversion, e.g. Rohde (2010) and Saito (2013), provide insightful foundations for the widely-used
model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), but they explicitly use inequity-aversion axioms to establish
this particular model and thus do not clarify the set of candidate models in general. In this section,
we derive two families of utility functions that represent altruism under behavioral assumptions
that are comparably well-accepted in related work on preference foundations, in particular on
choice under risk. One family captures payoff-based (CES) altruism and the other one captures
welfare-based altruism (generalizing Prospect theory). The only difference in the behavioral foun-
dation lies in an assumption clarifying whether subjects factor out background income (narrow
bracketing) or not (broad bracketing).
3.1 Theoretical framework
Decision maker DM has to choose an option x ∈ X where X is a convex subset of Rn. Each option
induces an n-dimensional outcome vector captured by π : X →Rn, with n ≥ 3.3 We will refer to π
as a payoff function, but nothing in our theoretical analysis is specific to preferences over payoff
3Assuming the outcome vector has at least three dimensions simplifies some of the statements made below regarding
existence of an additively separable utility representation. It is not crucial for the main result. If there was only one
essential dimension, existence of an additively separable representation would be trivial, and if there were exactly two
essential dimensions in the outcome vector, then existence of an additively separable representation would be ensured by
additionally assuming the hexagon condition of Wakker (1989, p. 47).
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profiles. For reasons clarified soon, we also say that π defines the “context” of the decision. We use
Π to denote the set of payoff functions (and thus contexts) for which the behavioral assumptions
are known to hold true. The image of π is π[X ] = {π(x)|x ∈ X}.
Preferences over options x ∈ X are expressed by %π, with π(x)%π π(y) indicating that π(x)
is weakly preferred to π(y). As usual, the strict preference π(x) ≻π π(y) indicates π(x) %π π(y)
and π(y) 6%π π(x). Note that this notation of preference is not redundant. It formally clarifies
that DM’s preferences are weakly outcome based, rather than option based, i.e. that DM is in-
different between two options whenever they induce the same outcomes contingent on context π.4
Intuitively, this assumption seems to be a concern if outcome-equivalent options with different
“connotations” are available, but we consider these options not to be outcome equivalent. Note
that we do not assume outcome basedness in the strict sense that preferences are independent of
context. Indeed, we specifically allow the preference relation %π to be context dependent. Thus,
most preference models discussed in analyses of giving can be represented without violating weak
outcome basedness in our sense: warm glow and cold prickle, envy and guilt, menu dependence,
image concerns, and of course (CES) altruism. Further, all axiomatic characterizations of pref-
erences that we are aware of imply weak outcome basedness by making the stronger assumption
of monotonicity. The direct assumption of weakly outcome-based preferences rather than mono-
tonicity allows us to capture the possibility of non-monotonic outcome-based preferences (which
relates, for example, to inequity aversion as the best-known non-monotonic preference).






1. Translatability: π,π′ ∈ Π ⇔ there exists c ∈ Rn such that π′ = c+π
2. Outcome image is a cone: π[X ] is a cone in Rn, i.e. for all x ∈ X and all λ ∈ (0,1), there
exists xλ ∈ X such that π(xλ) = λπ(x)
3. Essentialness: All n ≥ 3 dimensions are essential, i.e. for all i ≤ n and each π ∈ Π, there
exist p, p′ ∈ π[X ] such that p ≻π p
′ with p−i = p
′
−i.
First, different payoff functions π and π′ differ only by translation, i.e. by addition of con-
stants to all outcome vectors, and in turn, all translations are possible. We refer to these addi-
tive constants as the “background income” vector, which in turn characterizes the aforementioned
“context” of the decision problem. Distinguishing such contexts is novel in relation to the litera-
ture and will allow us to state assumptions about responses to changes in background income or
concurrent tasks, as discussed below. Second, the image of the set of options in the outcome space
is a cone, i.e. we can think of X as a budget set of a consumer facing linear prices: for any option
x ∈ X , an option xλ, for any λ ∈ (0,1), is available satisfying π(xλ) = λπ(x). This assumption im-
plies that the set of options is rich, in the sense that the set of possible outcomes π[X ] has positive
volume in Rn, which is required for uniqueness of the utility representation. Finally, essentialness
4Since we focus on distributive preferences, we neglect so-called belief-based components of preferences, i.e. prefer-
ences that depend on one’s belief about others’ actions. Generalizations allowing for belief-based parameters or references
points are straightforward to conceive.
5Slightly abusing notation, we identify all c ∈ Rn with constant functions so the addition of functions and constants is
well defined, i.e. for all π,π′ ∈ Π, if π′ = π+ c then π′(x) = π(x)+ c for all x ∈ X .
9
requires that there are no redundant dimensions of the outcome vector from DM’s perspective, i.e.
DM does not ignore any of the dimensions, which is a necessary condition for uniqueness of the
utility representation in all dimensions as well.
3.2 Axiomatic foundation of payoff-based and welfare-based altruism
We analyze the interplay of six axioms. The first two require that %π is a continuous weak order,
implying that it can be represented by a utility function. Separability (Axiom 3) ensures that an
additively separable utility representation exists: if two options are equivalent in any dimension,
then changing the value in this dimension equally for both options does not affect the preference
ordering between these options. Axioms 4–6 jointly define the functional form. Here, we will an-
alyze the implications of scaling invariance (Axiom 4) in conjunction with either broad bracketing





Assumption 2 (Axioms). For all π ∈ Π and all x,y ∈ X :
1. Weak order: %π is complete and transitive.
2. Continuity: If π(x)≻π π(y), there exists ε > 0 such that π(x
′)≻π π(y
′) for all x′ : d(x′,x)<
ε and all y′ : d(y′,y)< ε.
3. Separability: For any x′,y′ ∈ X such that π−i(x) = π−i(x
′) and π−i(y) = π−i(y
′), as well
as πi(x) = πi(y) and πi(x
′) = πi(y
′), we have π(x)%π π(y) iff π(x
′)%π π(y
′).
4. Scaling invariance: There exists a scaling-invariant context π0 ∈ Π, i.e. for any λ ∈ R :
λ > 0, if π0(x) = λπ0(x′) and π0(y) = λπ0(y′), then π0(x)%π0 π
0(y) ⇔ π0(x′)%π0 π
0(y′).
5. Broad bracketing: For any π′ ∈ Π, if π(x) = π′(x′) and π(y) = π′(y′), then π(x) %π π(y)
implies π′(x′)%π′ π
′(y′).
6. Narrow bracketing: For all c ∈ Rn, π(x)%π π(y) implies (π+ c)(x)%π+c (π+ c)(y).
Separability is also known as “independence of equal coordinates” (Wakker, 1989, p. 30).
It implies additive separability of the utility function and relates to a broad range of standard as-
sumptions: independence axioms in choice under risk (Wakker and Zank, 2002) or choice under
uncertainty (Skiadas, 2013), “independence of irrelevant alternatives” in stochastic choice (Luce,
1959), and separability in social welfare functions (Piacquadio, 2017). Further, additive separa-
bility obtains in most utility representations discussed in the literature on altruistic giving, such as
CES altruism (Andreoni and Miller, 2002), efficiency concerns (Charness and Rabin, 2002), and
impure altruism (Andreoni, 1990; Korenok et al., 2013).6
Scaling invariance requires that DM’s preferences over two options are robust to scaling the
outcome vectors associated with these options. It implies that the utility function is homothetic,
which again is satisfied by a broad range of utility functions discussed in the behavioral literature,
including CES altruism, inequity aversion, prospect theoretical utilities, and nested CES functions.
Scaling invariance is further supported by neuro-physiological evidence showing that the neural
6Violations of separability typically capture inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000).
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firing rate adapts to the scale of the choice problem (Padoa-Schioppa and Rustichini, 2014)7 and
a host of meta analyses showing that scaling differences between experiments are indeed choice-
irrelevant overall. This applies in dictator games (Engel, 2011), ultimatum games (Oosterbeek
et al., 2004; Cooper and Dutcher, 2011), trust games (Johnson and Mislin, 2011), and choice
under risk (Wilcox, 2008, 2011, 2015).
Finally, broad and narrow bracketing describe behavior in response to changes in “context”,
which in our case are changes in background income c ∈ Rn. Broad bracketing assumes that
background income is fully factored in when decisions are made, while narrow bracketing assumes
that background income is factored out. There is fairly strong evidence, from two strands of
literature, that background income is indeed factored out. On the one hand, behavior was shown to
be independent of socio-economic background variables such as income or wealth, see e.g. Gächter
et al. (2004) and Bellemare et al. (2008, 2011), and in general (Easterlin, 2001). In conjunction
with the wide range of results supporting narrow bracketing more generally (e.g. Read et al., 1999,
Rabin and Weizsäcker, 2009, Simonsohn and Gino, 2013), this suggests that narrow bracketing is
a substantially more adequate behavioral assumption than broad bracketing.
On the other hand, adaptive coding describes the neuro-economic observation that the neu-
ronal representation of subjective values (“utilities”) adapts to the range of values in any environ-
ment. This enables efficient adaptation to choice environments subject to the physical limitations
in neuronal firing rates, and was first observed by Tremblay and Schultz (1999) and subsequently
confirmed in a wide range of studies reviewed for example in Padoa-Schioppa and Rustichini
(2014) and Camerer et al. (2017). Specifically, Padoa-Schioppa (2009) showed that the baseline
activity of the cell encoding the value of a given object generally represents the minimum of the
value range, and the upper bound of the activity range of this “value cell” represents the upper
bound of the value range. Implicitly, both the scale of the value range and background utility is
factored out, yielding choice that satisfies scaling invariance and narrow bracketing simply as a
result of the physical limitations in neuronal firing.
As usual, we say that a preference relation %π is represented by a utility function uπ : X →R
if π(x)%π π(y)⇔ uπ(x)≥ uπ(y) for all x,y ∈ X . Proposition 1 establishes that, in conjunction with
the other axioms, preferences compatible with broad bracketing are represented by CES altruism
(“payoff-based altruism”) and preferences compatible with narrow bracketing are represented by
generalized prospect theoretical preferences (“welfare-based altruism”).
7The best option always has the maximal firing rate and the worst option always has the minimal firing rate, implying
that choice is independent of scale after a transition period where the neural firing rate adapts to the scale of the decision






Proposition 1. Given Assumption 1, there exist α ∈Rn, β ∈R, δ ∈Rn and r : Π →Rn such that
for all contexts π ∈ Π,
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The proof is relegated to the appendix. Existence of a continuous weak order (Axioms 1 and
2) implies that, in each context π, the preference relation %π can be represented by some utility
function uπ : X → R. Axiom 3 implies that an additively separable utility representation exists








represents %π. Broad bracketing implies that these value functions must be equivalent across con-
texts. Narrow bracketing requires that context shifts (changes in background income) are factored
out, which implies that payoffs must be evaluated in relation to some unknown reference points.
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simply adding the reference points in all dimensions (or any other constant; given separability,
the utility function is unique up to positive affine transformation). Formulation (3) may appear
more intuitive if the reference points differ from zero.8 Similarly, by uniqueness up to affine
transformation, the weights (αi) are unique up to scaling. A standard restriction here is to require
that (αi) adds up to 1. Finally, scaling invariance pins down the functional form of vi. By scaling













8It expresses the idea that meeting one’s reference point implies a utility exactly equal to the reference point (in case the
value function is the power function in Proposition 1). Thus, for example, an individual being $10 short of their reference
point $1,000,000 would enjoy a higher utility than an individual being $10 short of their reference point $20.
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with λ ∈ (0,1) both represent %π, and both being additively separable, this implies that they are









for some functions ai : R → R and b : R → R+. By Assumption 1.2, the value function vi is
defined on an interval of positive length, by Axiom 2 it is continuous, and by 1.3 it is not equal
to the constant function, which jointly implies that the unique solutions of this Pexider functional
equation (Aczél, 1966) are the power and logarithmic functions defined in Proposition 1.9
Two technical points appear worth noting. If there exists x ∈ X such that π0(x) = 0, where
π0 denotes the scaling-invariant context, then β > 0 obtains by continuity. Further, if we assume
monotonicity, the parameters (αi,δi) are guaranteed to be non-negative. While this appears plau-
sible in many cases, it would rule out some phenomena resembling inequity aversion, the defining
characteristic of which is that preferences are non-monotonic in the opponents’ outcomes.10
3.3 Discussion
To summarize, broad bracketing induces a context-independent reference point of zero, yielding
the well-known CES model of altruism where payoffs are evaluated in absolute terms. This cap-
tures altruism as concern for the payoffs of others. Narrow bracketing implies that payoffs are
evaluated in relation to reference points ri(π) = πi(x)− π
0
i (x), where π
0 is the scaling invariant
context existing by Axiom 4. This implies that altruism is a concern for the S-shaped welfares
of others known from prospect theory, i.e. for the (individual) welfares they believe the others
would derive from the various outcomes in single-person decision problems. Switching from
broad bracketing to narrow bracketing is in this sense equivalent to switching from altruism as a
concern for the payoff of others to altruism as a concern for the welfare of others. Next, we briefly
discuss this observation in relation to prominent strands of literature.
Contexts and narrow bracketing Following Read et al. (1999), narrow bracketing refers to
the phenomenon that concurrent decision problems are treated independently by decision mak-
ers, implying that other tasks simply provide a background income (the “context”) that is factored
out. Using this observation as part of an axiomatic foundation is novel and to be distinguished
from translation invariance. Specifically, narrow bracketing operates between contexts (changes
in background income) and translation invariance operates within contexts.11 The distinction is
noteworthy, as it is narrow bracketing, rather than translation invariance, that is backed by the
behavioral and neuroeconomic evidence cited above. Further, narrow bracketing is compatible
9For illustrative purposes, assume vi is also differentiable and let ai = 0 (which removes the logarithmic solution). That
is, vi(λ πi) = b(λ) · vi(πi), and after taking logarithms on both sides, we obtain for ṽi = logvi and b̃ = logb,
ṽi(λ πi) = b̃(λ)+ ṽi(πi) ⇒ ṽ
′
i(λ πi) ·πi = b̃
′(λ) ⇒ ṽ′i(πi) = β/πi
after taking the derivative with respect to λ and letting λ= 1. This differential equation has the solution ṽi(πi)= β logπi+αi
and reverting the logarithm we obtain vi(πi) = αi ·π
β
i .
10For example, inequity averse subjects prefer (10,9) over (11,20), or (0,0) over (1,9). Without monotonicity, welfare-
based altruism can capture such preferences, and in this way, it can also capture rejections in ultimatum games.
11Translation invariance requires that if one pair of options yields payoff vectors πx and πy, and another pair of options
yields πx + r and πy + r for some r ∈R, then the respective choices must be equivalent (see for example Skiadas, 2013). In
contrast, narrow bracketing poses no restriction for different pairs of options.
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with scaling invariance, as one operates between contexts and the other one operates within con-
texts, implying that by formalizing narrow bracketing as a preference axiom we can acknowledge
both observations on human behavior in the axiomatic analysis. Translation invariance (within
contexts) is obviously not compatible with scaling invariance.
Reference dependence Narrow bracketing implies reference dependence; it implies the exis-
tence of reference points with the testable prediction that reference points move 1:1 as the back-
ground income changes. This yields a foundation of reference dependence without an ex-ante
specification of reference points. The result generalizes existing axiomatic foundations of prospect
theoretical utilities, which so far explicitly assume existence of a reference point, where the refer-
ence point is either an exogenously defined payoff vector (Wakker and Tversky, 1993; Wakker and
Zank, 2002) or a well-defined option (Schmidt, 2003). Further, the link between narrow bracket-
ing and reference dependence is established based on axioms not related specifically to altruism
or giving, underlining its generality and corroborating the observation that both narrow bracketing
and reference dependence build on a wealth of empirical evidence (outside prospect theory, see for
example Kőszegi and Rabin, 2007, 2009, for discussion).
Reference points The reference points may reflect any (weighted) mean of status quo (Kahne-
man et al., 1991) and expectations (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006), since any such mean satisfies the
above condition that adding a fixed vector of background incomes to all payoff profiles raises the
vector of reference points by exactly that vector (assuming expectations are independent of the
background income). Further, reference points are idiosyncratic, reflecting that different decision
makers may well disagree about the status quo or the expectations in a given choice task. In turn,
the above axioms do not imply normative restrictions about the absolute values of reference points
or that there is a normative or objective definition of the status quo.
Context dependence Our notation allows preferences to depend on the payoff function π, while
the option set X is assumed to be constant. In general, X may vary as well, and π may vary by more
than changes in background income. We have not imposed assumptions linking preferences across
such changes in contexts, implying that preferences may change arbitrarily when say the image
π[X ] changes in dimensions other than the background income. The existing literature analyzes
how reference points may depend on say π[X ], usually in the form of expectation-based reference
points. In individual decision making this was proposed by Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) and ex-
perimentally observed for example in Falk et al. (2011) and Gill and Prowse (2012). In games
such expectation-based models imply reciprocity, as discussed in Rabin (1993), Levine (1998),
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006). Implicitly, by allowing
for expectation-based reference dependence, our simple model of altruism is compatible with these
models of reciprocity, in particular once we recognize that the “context” may be a function of pre-
vious moves by other players. Then, preferences may immediately reflect the kindness of such
moves as discussed in the literature.
Choice under risk Our analysis relates to studies of preferences in choice under risk, see for
example Wakker and Tversky (1993) for an analysis assuming differentiability and Skiadas (2013)
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for a recent analysis without differentiability. Most axioms in this branch of literature are similar
to those imposed above, suggesting the possibility of constructing a general, unified foundation of
behavior. The main difference of our analysis to this literature is the formal distinction of contexts.
This is substantial, as it allows us to analyze narrow bracketing instead of translation invariance,
which in turn is compatible with scaling invariance. The similarities are that analyses of choice
under risk also work with existence of a weak order, continuity, and generally an independence
assumption yielding additive separability across possible outcomes. Skiadas (2016) shows that
system of axioms including scaling invariance implies a form of CES preferences that is similar
to CES altruism as characterized above (i.e. not to welfare-based altruism), while one including
translation invariance implies exponential rather than power utilities resembling constant absolute
risk aversion. His results suggest that scaling invariance and translation invariance are mutually
exclusive in axiomatic foundations, although both tend to be confirmed in behavioral meta studies,
a conflict that is resolved in our analysis.
Inequity aversion To discuss the relation to inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), recall
that using |r|+ to be equal to r if r > 0 and equal to zero otherwise, inequity averse decision makers
have utilities
u(π) = π1 −α1 · |π1 −π2|+−α2 · |π2 −π1|+,
where guilt has weight α1 and envy has weight α2. In relation to welfare-based altruism, inequity
aversion relaxes additive separability (in a specific manner) and violates narrow bracketing, while it
satisfies scaling invariance and broad bracketing. Yet, welfare-based altruism contains FS inequity
aversion as a special case in constant-sum games. To see this, assume that π1(x)+π2(x) is constant
for all options x ∈ X and let (r1,r2) denote the reference points. Inequity aversion corresponds to
the special case r1 = r2 = (π1+π2)/2 of linear welfare-based altruism. Assuming “loss aversion”,
i.e. δ > 1, this yields a piecewise linear utility function which is steeper in case of envy (π1 < π2)
than in case of guilt (π1 ≥ π2), implying inequity aversion as defined by Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
Warm glow and cold prickle Andreoni (1989, 1990) argues that warm glow and cold prickle
affect behavior in the sense that players derive utility directly from the amount they transfer or
take. In dictator games such preferences can rationalize incomplete crowding-out. Using e1 and e2
to denote the players’ endowments, warm glow is proportional to the amount e1 −π1 transferred
from the own endowment (weight α1) and cold prickle is proportional to the amount e2 −π2 taken
from the other endowment (weight α2), implying utilities
u(π) = π1 +α1 · |e1 −π1|+−α2 · |e2 −π2|+.
The difference to models of “pure” altruism such as CES altruism is that the extent of both warm
glow and cold prickle is independent of how the respective other party benefits. If preferences
exhibit warm glow and cold prickle, then, similar to welfare-based altruism, a scaling invariant
context exists and separability obtains, but neither broad nor narrow bracketing applies. Narrow
bracketing is violated as the first term is not reference dependent and broad bracketing is violated
because the other terms are reference dependent. That is, narrow and broad bracketing are violated
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in specific ways and in addition the reference points explicitly equate with the endowments rather
than arising implicitly. Hence, comparably strong axioms would be required to behaviorally found
such “impure” altruism; axioms that seem difficult to motivate based on independent behavioral
results. This substantially limits generalizability to the wide range of interactions where endow-
ments and hence warm glow as well as cold prickle are not explicitly defined, such as bargaining
games or mini-dictator games.
4 Implications for giving: Theory
We now apply the representation result (Proposition 1) to study giving of welfare-based altruists
and how it relates to the observations made in experiments. By context dependence, the reference
points r1,r2 may be arbitrary functions of the game Γ = 〈B1,B2,P1, t〉, but we know there exist
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β if p2(p1)≥ r2
−δ(r2 − t(B− p1))
β if p2(p1)< r2
}
.
As above, α is the degree of altruism, δ is the degree of loss-aversion, and β captures the trade-off
between efficiency and equity concerns; 1
1+β is the elasticity of substitution between dictator’s and
recipient’s well-being. Without loss of generality, we assume that δ is the same for both players,
and for notational simplicity, we skip the limiting case β = 0.
The reference points contain the players’ background incomes as additive constants by Propo-
sition 1, which we represent by the players’ minimal payoffs, and may otherwise be arbitrarily
complex functions of the game characteristics such as payoff function and option sets. For the fol-
lowing analysis, we express this richness as a two-parametric family of functions of the ranges of
payoffs. Specifically, for each player we determine how much of her endowment is at the disposal
of the dictator and allow her to form expectations about how the surplus is allocated. Every player
expects to be allocated share w1 ∈ [0,1] of the surplus she contributes and share w2 ∈ [0,1] of the
surplus contributed by the other player, on top of min p1 and min p2 (the “background incomes”).
Assumption 3. In game Γ = 〈B1,B2,P1, t〉, the reference points satisfy, for some w1,w2 ∈ [0,1],
r1(Γ) = min p1 +w1 · (B1 −min p1)+w2 · (B2 −min p2/t),
r2(Γ) = min p2 +w2 · t · (B1 −min p1)+w1 · (t ·B2 −min p2).
This model contains status-quo-based reference points (w1 =w2 = 0) and strict expectations-
based reference points (w1 +w2 = 1) as the most notable special cases, and by allowing for w1 +
w2 ∈ (0,1) all convex combinations are also included. Below, we even allow for w1 +w2 > 1, to
capture social-pressure givers, but this case is theoretically rather simple (social-pressure givers
always choose corner solutions) and will therefore be sidelined initially.
Dictators are welfare-based altruists denoted as ∆ = (α,β,δ,w1,w2). Besides satisfiability
of reference points (w1 +w2 ≤ 1), we assume that dictators are imperfectly altruistic (0 ≤ α ≤ 1),
imperfectly efficiency concerned (0 < β < 1), and weakly loss averse (δ ≥ 1). Both 0 < β < 1 and
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δ ≥ 1 are standard assumptions in, for example, prospect theoretical analyses, ensuring S-shaped
utilities and avoiding loss seeking, which we therefore adopt as well. Weak altruism (α ≤ 1) is
a standard assumption in analyses of social preferences and α ≥ 0 is assumed without loss of
generality as egoism (α = 0) is equivalent to spite (α < 0) in the games we analyze.
Definition 2. Dictator ∆= (α,β,δ,w1,w2) is called regular if she exhibits imperfect altruism (0≤
α≤ 1), weak efficiency concerns (0< β< 1), loss aversion (δ≥ 1), and satisfiability (w1+w2 ≤ 1).
Proposition 2 formally characterizes giving of welfare-based altruists to provide the basic





Proposition 2. There exist thresholds (δ−(Γ),δ+(Γ)) in terms of the degree of loss aversion δ











2 (Γ)), if δ > max{δ
+(Γ),δ−(Γ)} (interior solution)
(max p1,min p2), if δ < δ
+(Γ) (egoistic solution)
(min p1,max p2), if δ < δ
−(Γ) (altruistic solution)
with (p+1 (Γ), p
+
2 (Γ)) referring to the interior solution
p+1 (Γ) =
t B+ cα r1(Γ)− r2(Γ)/t
cα +1
p+2 (Γ) =
t cα (B− r1(Γ))+ r2(Γ)
cα +1
with cα := (α t
β)
1
1−β . In any generalized dictator game Γ = 〈B1,B2,P1, t〉, there are regular dic-
tators choosing the interior solution and regular dictators choosing either the egoistic solution
(max p1,min p2) or the altruistic solution (min p1,max p2).
That is, there are up to three types of welfare-based altruists: some give nothing or take all
(choosing the lower bound), some give a bit (choosing an interior solution), and some give all
(choosing the upper bound). In the interior solution, both reference points are satisfied, which
implies that many possible decisions can be ruled out. Further, the types of welfare-based altruists
are defined using simple thresholds (δ−(Γ),δ+(Γ)) in terms of the degree of loss aversion δ, and
after ruling out loss seeking (δ < 1), the cases δ < δ+(Γ) and δ < δ−(Γ) are mutually exclusive.
Thus, δ allows us to rank dictators by their propensity to choose either of the corner solutions.
Dictators with a low degree of loss aversion δ have a high propensity to choose a corner solution,
evaluating the extra costs of not satisfying a reference point as low, and dictators with a high
degree of loss aversion pick an interior solution. The type of corner solution chosen by dictators
with low δ depends on both their degree of altruism α and the transfer efficiency t, where the
altruistic corner solution is relevant if α tβ ≥ 1 and the egoistic corner solution otherwise. The
thresholds are continuous in the game parameters 〈B1,B2,P1, t〉 and the preference parameters
(α,β,w1,w2). This allows us to characterize the comparative statics of behavior across dictator
games. Finally, and most importantly for the implications on giving, the interior solution has very
intuitive comparative statics: The recipient’s payoff is decreasing in the dictator’s reference point
r1, increasing in the recipient’s reference point r2 and budget B, and increasing in the transfer rate
t.
In conjunction with the similarly intuitive comparative statics of the behavioral thresholds
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δ+(Γ) and δ−(Γ), this directly predicts the stylized facts observed in the literature (Table 1).
Proposition 3 establishes this formally, a detailed discussion follows. As above, we say a dic-
tator is a “giver” if she transfers some of her endowment to the recipient, she is a “taker” if the
net-transfer is negative, and comparing two games, we say that the range of taking options is





Proposition 3. Assume dictators ∆ = (α,β,δ,w1,w2) are randomly distributed in R
5 such that
dictator ∆ has positive density if and only if dictator ∆ is regular. All “stylized facts” are implied.
1. Non-convexity In all games with P1 = [0,B], some dictators have non-convex preferences.
2. Taking options reduce giving both at the extensive and intensive margin Introducing a
taking option turns some initial givers into takers and reduces average amounts given.
3. Incomplete crowding out Reallocating initial endowment from the dictator to the recipient
results (in expectation) in a payoff increase for the recipient.
4. Efficiency concerns The recipient’s payoff is weakly increasing in the transfer rate.
5. Reluctant sharers When an outside option is introduced, some initial givers switch to that
option while the behavior of dictators who sort into the game stays unaffected.
6. Social pressure givers Ceteris paribus, higher susceptibility to social pressure (higher w2)
implies higher transfers in the interior solution but also a higher propensity to choose the
outside option in a sorting game.
Non-convexity of preferences and jumping to take all The most distinctive characteristic of
welfare-based altruism is the implied non-convexity of preferences. Figure 1 considers a dictator
asked to allocate a budget of 20 tokens between herself and the recipient at a transfer rate of t = 1.
Suppose that the reference points are r2 = 5 for the recipient and r1 = 10 for the dictator. Figure
1a depicts the trade-off that the dictator faces between her own and the recipient’s welfare. The
more the dictator allocates to the recipient, the higher is the recipient’s welfare (solid curve) but
the lower is the dictator’s own welfare (dashed curve). The individual welfares are steeper the
closer the players are to their respective reference points. For recipient payoffs between 5 and
10, both the recipient and the dictator are in the gain domain, i.e. they achieve payoffs at least as
high as their respective reference points, whereas for all other allocations one of them is in the
loss domain. Figure 1b depicts the dictator’s utility if her weight on the recipient’s well-being
is α = 0.3. This dictator’s utility function reaches its maximum at an interior solution where the
transfer slightly exceeds the recipient’s reference point.
Figure 1c depicts the utility of a slightly less altruistic dictator (α = 0.2). This dictator’s
optimal choice is the corner solution of allocating nothing to the recipient. The S-shaped form of
the individual welfare function implies that the deeper the recipient moves into the loss domain,
the lower the marginal reduction in recipient welfare for any further token not allocated to him.
In conjunction with weak altruism and the correspondingly S-shaped dictator welfare, this implies
that dictator utility is not quasi-concave—it bends upwards once the recipient is sufficiently far
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Figure 1: Non-convexity of preferences and implications in taking games
(a) Welfares of recipient (solid) and dic-
tator (dashed) with β = 0.6 and δ = 2

































(b) Utility of a dictator with α = 0.3























(c) Utility of a dictator with α = 0.2



























Note: The dictator can choose to allocate x tokens to the recipient, where x ∈ [0,20]. The transfer rate is t = 1. The
recipient’s reference point is r2 = 5 while the dictator’s reference point is r1 = 10. The dashed lines in (b) and (c) mark the
recipient’s reference point.
below his reference point. Ceteris paribus, the lower the weight α that the dictator assigns to the
recipient’s welfare, the earlier this minimum is reached and the more likely it is that the dictator’s
utility from choosing the lower bound exceeds her utility in the interior solution.
As a result, dictator behavior is not generally continuous in the game parameters, which in
turn predicts the “preference reversals” observed in taking games. To see this, have another look
at Figure 1c, now assuming the recipient’s reference point equates with his endowment (B2 = 5
and B1 = 15). That is, if the dictator allocates, say, 4 to the recipient, then she actually takes from
his endowment. For simplicity, also assume that reference points are invariant to changes in the
dictator’s choice set, which is covered in the subsequent discussion of “taking games”, and let us
start with the case that the dictator cannot take from the recipient’s endowment. In this case, the
dictator cannot implement an allocation with a recipient payoff below his reference point, to the
left of the vertical dotted line in Figure 1c, and chooses the interior solution to the right. Now,
as we extend the option set by allowing for taking one token from the recipient, allocations to
the left of the vertical dotted line become admissible. Initially, upon extending the option set,
the dictator’s utility at the lower bound is decreasing. The recipient’s welfare drops sharply and
the dictator is concerned for his welfare. Eventually, upon further extending the option set into the
taking domain, the dictator’s utility reaches a minimum and starts increasing again. Eventually, the
dictator prefers the lower bound to the interior solution and jumps to taking as much as possible.
Such a “preference reversal” cannot be observed for the more altruistic dictator in Figure 1b as
long as the recipient’s payoff is restricted to be non-negative.
Taking games Introducing taking options decreases the recipient’s minimal payoff, i.e. his back-
ground income. Regardless of whether the recipient has status-quo-based or expectations-based
reference points, or a convex combination from the general class in Assumption 3, the recipient’s
reference point will consequentially decline. The reduction in the recipient’s minimal payoff at the
same time raises the surplus B2 −min p2/t he contributes, but generically (for all w1 < 1) the first
effect dominates. Loosely speaking, the recipient will be happy with less. In turn, the dictator’s
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reference point weakly increases through her partial claim on the increasing surplus contributed
by the recipient (if w2 > 0). That is, after introducing taking options, the dictator asks for more.
Both effects directly imply, at the intensive margin, that the dictator transfers less in the interior
solution, which has the obvious comparative statics in reference points by Proposition 2. In addi-
tion, as the lower bound declines, defecting towards the lower bound becomes more attractive for
the dictator (recall Figure 1) and with the increase of the own reference point, the interior solution
becomes less attractive. As a result, at the extensive margin, dictators are more likely to pick the
lower bound, and across the population, the share of regular dictators who choose the lower bound
increases while the share of regular dictators who choose the interior solution decreases.
Generalized endowments Assume part of the dictator’s endowment is reallocated to the recipi-
ent and the dictator cannot take any of it back, i.e. her budget correspondingly declines. Then, the
dictator’s background income is constant but the surplus she contributes (B1 −min p1) decreases,
while the recipient’s background income increases and his surplus remains constant. As a result,
the dictator’s reference point declines and the recipient’s reference point increases. By the com-
parative statics of the interior solution, the dictator thus allocates less to herself and more to the
recipient at the interior solution, implying incomplete crowding out of endowment reallocations.
Sorting games Lazear et al. (2012) call a dictator a “reluctant sharer” if she transfers a positive
amount in a standard dictator game but sorts out when possible. That is, her utility from the
interior solution is lower than her utility from the outside option ( p̃1,0)—assuming the recipient
is not informed about the dictator and her options if she sorts out. Remaining uninformed if the
dictator sorts out, from the recipient’s perspective literally nothing happens, both reference point
and payoff are zero, and he remains welfare neutral. This removes the negative externality imposed
by the recipient’s expectations and may therefore be preferable for the dictator. To see this, assume
reference points are just “satisfiable”, i.e. B = r1 + r2/t, and the dictator chooses to satisfy them
in the standard dictator game (as opposed to choosing the lower bound). The interior solution
generates zero surplus for either player and consequentially zero utility. Then, sorting out is strictly
preferable whenever p̃1 > r1. If we set p̃1 =B1 and start declining it, as in the experiment of Lazear
et al. (2012), the condition p̃1 > r1 is first violated for dictators with high reference points r1, who
transfer the least at the interior solution. These players are thus predicted to sort in first, regardless
of how subjects mix status quo and expectations forming reference points, which corroborates the
observation of Lazear et al. (2012) that the least generous dictators sort back in first.
5 Implications for giving: Test on data
We complement the theoretical analysis by testing the model on data from the seminal experiments
cited above. We examine whether welfare-based altruism indeed helps improve our understanding
of giving in a statistically significant manner. In this way, we can control for the additional degrees
of freedom arising in relation to the standard model of payoff-based CES altruism, the two refer-
ence points. To be clear, the fact that the theoretical predictions match the comparative statics for
all distributions of reference points given “regularity” of dictator preferences strongly suggests that
welfare-based altruism does capture giving more reliably than payoff-based altruism—without the
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Table 2: The experiments re-analyzed to verify model adequacy
Abbreviation #Treatments # Subjects #Observations
Dictator games Andreoni and Miller (2002) AM02 8 176 1408
Harrison and Johnson (2006) HJ06 10 56 560
Generalized endowments
Cappelen et al. (2007) CHST07 11 96 190
Korenok et al. (2012) KMR12 8 34 272
Korenok et al. (2013) KMR13 18 119 2142
Taking (and generalized endowments)
List (2007) List07 3 120 120
Bardsley (2008) Bard08 6 180 180
Korenok et al. (2014) KMR14 9 106 954
Sorting Lazear et al. (2012) LMW12 8 94 518
Aggregate Pooled 83 981 6578
necessity of fine-tuning parameters. Yet, in future applications, the additional degrees of freedom
may increase the susceptibility to overfitting, as observed for example by Hey et al. (2010) ana-
lyzing models of choice under risk. This would limit the model’s usefulness when predicting, say,
implications of policy interventions or mechanism designs, or simply when interpreting behavior.
This is tested next. For the lack of comparable analyses in the existing literature, we include a
number of well-known models as benchmarks to provide some context.
5.1 The data
Table 2 summarizes the types of dictator games and data sets we re-analyze. All of them repre-
sent seminal papers run for the purpose of characterizing preferences underlying giving, rendering
them adequate also for our purpose of validating utility representations of preferences. In total, we
analyze behavior across 9 experiments, 83 treatments and 6500 observations. In relation to com-
parable studies of model validity, e.g. on choice under risk, this represents a very comprehensive
data set, promising reliable results.
To our knowledge, our data set includes all experiments on generalized dictator games, i.e.
with generalized endowments, taking, or sorting options, complete information, at least three treat-
ments, manual entry of choices, and freely available data sets. The focus on experiments with at
least three treatments facilitates statistically informative likelihood ratios but it precludes small ex-
periments, most notably a seminal paper on sorting (Dana et al., 2006). The focus on games with
complete information facilitates a unified theoretical treatment but precludes field experiments on
charitable giving (such as DellaVigna et al., 2012) and experiments on moral wiggle room (Dana
et al., 2007; van der Weele et al., 2014). The focus on games with manual choice entry simplifies
out-of-sample predictions but precludes experiments with graphical user interfaces (Fisman et al.,
2007). Finally, the focus on games with freely available data sets precludes the inclusion of exper-
iments with real-effort tasks preceding the dictator game. However, as reviewed above, the main
patterns in real-effort games resemble those in dictator games with generalized endowments and
windfall budgets, three of which are included.
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A notable difference between the analyzed dictator game experiments concerns the language
used in the instructions for assigning the players’ endowments. In standard dictator games (e.g.
AM02 and HJ06), direct assignments are avoided by stating that “a number of tokens is to be
divided”, while in taking games (e.g. List07, Bard08, and KMR14), endowments are explicitly
assigned prior to the choice task. This may provoke status quo and endowment effects (Samuel-
son and Zeckhauser, 1988; Kahneman et al., 1991) but to our knowledge it has not been dis-
cussed as a behavioral confound in preference analyses of (generalized) dictator games. Table 4
in the appendix reviews the relevant passages in the experimental instructions and distinguishes
between neutral language, where specific assignments of the endowments to either of the players
are avoided, and loaded language, where initial endowments are specifically assigned or otherwise
attributed to either of the players. Neutral language is typically used in standard dictator game
experiments (AM02 and HJ06) and in sorting games (LMW12). Loaded language is typically
used in experiments with generalized endowments or taking options. The hypothesis that such
language differences affect the distribution of reference points and thus induce endowment effects
as observed in other studies will be verified below and will be taken into account throughout the
entire analysis.
For the following analysis, we use the simplest formulation of reference points that seems
conceivable, simplifying even in relation to Assumption 3, in order to rule out any biases in the
results due to choosing functional forms,
r1 = w1 ·B1 +w2 · tB2, r2 = w1 · tB2 +w2 ·B1.
Since the qualitative results hold regardless of the distribution of reference points, such functional
form assumptions are largely irrelevant, however. The robustness checks in Appendix C explicitly
show that alternative functional forms mapping endowments to reference points yield results very
similar to those reported here. As above, we allow that the weights w1,w2 ∈ [0,1] do not necessar-
ily add up to 1, while we assume that they satisfy w1 ≥ w2. The former allows that subjects may
be both altruistic givers (w1 +w2 < 1) and social pressure givers (w1 +w2 ≥ 1), thereby capturing
the types observed by DellaVigna et al. (2012), while the latter assumes that subjects put higher
weight on the role they end up playing in case their decision turns out to be payoff relevant. As
usual, we fix the loss-aversion parameter at δ = 2 to remove a degree of freedom.
5.2 Heterogeneity and consistency of reference points
First, we examine heterogeneity of reference points within experiments (i.e. within subject pools)
and consistency of reference point distributions across experiments (i.e. types of dictator games).
We begin with examining consistency across experiments. For, the differences in the language used
when assigning endowments potentially preclude consistency across experiments, which might
render the subsequent robustness analysis futile. Further, it would limit applicability of reference
dependent concepts such as welfare-based altruism, or indeed any existing concept, to understand
the behavioral reasons for differences in giving across experiments.
Formally, we estimate the individual reference points of all subjects in the largest experi-
ment from each class of games: dictator games (AM02), games with generalized endowments
(KMR13), sorting games (LMW12), and taking games (KMR14). To be precise, we estimate
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all four individual preference parameters for all subjects, as reference points cannot be estimated
without controlling for altruism α and efficiency concerns β, but in the present subsection, we
focus on the distributions of reference points. As the estimation procedure is standard maximum
likelihood all details on optimization algorithms, generation of starting values, and cross-checking
to ensure global optimality of estimates are relegated to the appendix. After estimating the ref-
erence point weights (w1,w2) for all subjects, we evaluate their structure in a cluster analysis by
affinity propagation (Dueck and Frey, 2007). Figure 2 provides the results.













































Cluster 1 0.002 0.002 104/176 59%
Cluster 2 0.359 0.203 32/176 18%








































Cluster 1 0 0 60/119 50%
Cluster 2 0.631 0.144 32/119 27%

















































Cluster 1 0.106 0.084 32/94 34%
Cluster 2 0.71 0.215 20/94 21%













































Cluster 1 0.049 0.032 37/106 35%
Cluster 2 0.69 0.267 39/106 37%
Cluster 3 0.657 0.593 30/106 28%
Note: For the largest experiments from each type of generalized dictator game, all individual reference point weights
(w1,w2) are estimated, plotted with w1 on the horizontal axis and w2 on the vertical axis, and clustered by affinity prop-
agation (Dueck and Frey, 2007). The centers and sizes of the three clusters identified in each case are provided in the
respective tables to the right.
Consistently across data sets, three clusters of subjects are identified. All clusters tend to be
of similar size, comprising around one third of the subjects. In all cases, there is one group of
subjects with endowment-independent reference points (w1 ≈ w2 ≈ 0), one group of subjects with
“satisfiable” reference points where weights add up to less than one (w1 +w2 < 1), and one group
of subjects with “excessive” reference points where weights add up to more than one (w1+w2 ≥ 1).
The center of the second group moves a little between studies, but overall, the centers and sizes
of the clusters are remarkably robust—and they fit received findings in the literature. The first
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group contains the “egoistic” subjects maximizing their pecuniary payoffs, a group comprising
around one third of the subjects in all dictator game experiments. The members of the second
and the third group comprise subjects that transfer tokens to the recipients either out of largely
altruistic concerns (second group) or out of perceived social pressure (third group)—and further





Result 1. Across all four types of dictator games, there are three similarly-sized groups of sub-
jects: subjects with endowment-independent reference points (mostly egoists), subjects with sat-
isfiable reference points (“altruistic givers”), and subjects with non-satisfiable reference points
(“social pressure givers”).
5.3 Significance and robustness of welfare-based altruism
Next, if reference dependence is a robust behavioral trait, then accounting for it improves our
understanding of giving across contexts, and it does so not only ex-post but also ex-ante. That
is, acknowledging reference dependence should improve predictions across contexts, i.e. across
types of dictator games. This way, it would help improve policy recommendations and guide
(behavioral) mechanism design.13 Given the data sets analyzed here, we can evaluate this question
directly by analyzing predictions across the types of dictator game experiments listed in Table 2.
In addition, if reference dependence is a behavioral primitive, then it improves on alternative
ways of providing the implied degrees of freedom. Given the existing literature, there are two
arguably natural extensions of CES altruism that have to be considered as benchmark models. The
first benchmark extends CES altruism by warm glow and cold prickle, as proposed by Korenok
et al. (2014). Using (e1,e2) as the players’ endowments, this model is expressed as




2 +α2 · |e1 −π1|
β
+−α3 · |e2 −π2|
β
+.
(+ Warm Glow/Cold Prickle)
As above, |x|+ equates with x if x > 0 and it equates with 0 otherwise. Thus, |e1 −π1|+ captures
the amount transferred by the dictator from her endowment (inducing “warm glow” which is inde-
pendent of the amount received by the recipient), and |e2 −π2|+ captures the amount taken from
the recipient’s endowment (inducing “cold prickle”). The other benchmark extends CES altruism
by motives of envy and guilt (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) as proposed by Korenok et al. (2012).




2 −α2 · |π1−π2|+−α3 · |π2−π1|+ (+ Inequity Aversion)
12Members of both the second and the third group react to the endowments induced via the experimental design. The
difference is that the reference points of members in the second group do not eat up the entire budget, while the reference
points of members in the third group cannot be satisfied jointly. The members of the third group transfer tokens aiming
to satisfy both players’ reference points as good as possible, and in this sense, they react solely to the social pressure they
perceive due to their (subjective) reference points. The members of the second group, however, react significantly weaker
to the social pressure (i.e. to induced endowments), thanks to having smaller weights (w1,w2) and mainly decide how to
transfer the (often substantial) residual amount after satisfying both reference points. In this sense, they are altruistic givers.
13A related range of applications concerns attempts to factor out altruism (or risk aversion) from behavior, to identify
other sources of gender-related differences (see for example Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). To this end, first some
treatment is run to identify known preference differences, and these differences are then extrapolated to another task to
help identify residual differences. The extrapolation requires predictive accuracy across contexts as analyzed here.
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Table 3: Behavioral predictions across types of dictator game experiments
Descriptive Predictive Details on predictions of . . .
Calibrated on Altruism is . . . Adequacy Adequacy Dictator Endowments Taking Sorting
Dictator Games Payoff based (CES) 1460.9 8950.5 1343.4 4339 2353.3 914.7
+ Warm Glow/Cold Prickle 1507.3−− 8854.6 1343 4218.4+ 2375.2 917.9
+ Inequity Aversion 1234.6++ 8794.8++ 1217.1+ 4311.7 2360.7 905.3
Welfare based 1146.6++ 8758++ 1279.8+ 4273.8+ 2316.6+ 887.7
Welfare based (adj) 1146.6++ 8603.9++ 1263.9+ 4152.5++ 2300.8++ 888.2
Gen Endowments Payoff based (CES) 2896.6 8752.9 4260.4 826.1 2613.8 1052.7
+ Warm Glow/Cold Prickle 2395.5++ 8967.8−− 4289.6 954.5−− 2649.7 1074
+ Inequity Aversion 2800.1+ 8916.4−− 4333.6− 849.9 2663−− 1069.9−−
Welfare based 2662.7++ 8416.7++ 4084.2++ 767.9+ 2565.9+ 998.7++
Welfare based (adj) 2662.7++ 7867.7++ 3985.8++ 637.1++ 2351++ 895.4++
Taking Games Payoff-based (CES) 1482.4 9700.7 3739.3 4466.7 579.7 914.9
+ Warm Glow/Cold Prickle 1451.8 10252.5−− 4263.8−− 4408.7 592.8 987.2−−
+ Inequity Aversion 1419.2+ 9736.7 3543.3++ 4698.2−− 576.6 918.5
Welfare-based 1226.4++ 9499.7+ 3729.2 4343.2 568.5+ 858.8++
Welfare based (adj) 1226.4++ 9270.3++ 3633+ 4232.9++ 559.3++ 846.6++
Aggregate Payoff based (CES) 5839.8 27404.1 9343.1 9631.8 5546.8 2882.4
+ Warm Glow/Cold Prickle 5354.6++ 28075−− 9896.5−− 9581.6 5617.8− 2979.1−−
+ Inequity Aversion 5453.9++ 27447.9 9094+ 9859.8−− 5600.4−− 2893.7
Welfare based 5035.7++ 26674.4++ 9093.2++ 9385++ 5451++ 2745.2++
Welfare based (adj) 5035.7++ 25740.4++ 8883.6++ 9023.5++ 5212.2++ 2631.2++
Note: For each type of dictator game experiment used to estimate the parameters (standard “Dictator games” in AM02,
“Generalized endowments” in KMR13, “Taking Games” in KMR14), we report for each of the five models the in-sample
fit (“Descriptive Adequacy”), the pooled out-of-sample fit by predicting all other experiments in Table 2 (“Predictive
Adequacy”), and the detailed predictive adequacy for each type of experiments as distinguished in Table 2 (the four right-
most columns). Plus and Minus signs indicate significance of differences of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for
each of the generalizations of the CES model to the CES model. The likelihood-ratio tests (Schennach and Wilhelm, 2016)
are robust to misspecification and arbitrary nesting, and we distinguish significance levels of .05 (+,−) and .01 (++,−−). In
all cases, we cluster at the subject level to account for the panel character of the data.
An attractive feature of these models is that they also contain four free parameters in total, in this
respect equating with welfare-based altruism, which implies that these models can be estimated
following the exact same procedure as welfare-based altruism. This way, we can ensure compa-
rability of the results. All the technical details on likelihood maximization and statistical tests are
provided in the appendix.
We estimate all models on each of the three largest data sets, i.e. on standard dictator games
(AM02), on games with generalized endowments (KMR13), and on games with taking options
(KMR14), and predict behavior in all data sets listed in Table 2.14 The results are summarized
in Table 3. The “Descriptive Adequacy” is the Akaike information criterion of the in-sample fit,
i.e. the sum of absolute value of the log-likelihood and number of parameters (in-sample, every
reference point of every subject counts as a free parameter). The predictive adequacy is reported
both in aggregate (column “Predictive Adequacy”) and segregated by type of dictator game to be
14We do not consider predictions based on estimates from the sorting game experiment of LMW12, as their experimental
design varies neither the transfer rate (fixed to 1 : 1) nor the endowments of dictators and receivers, varying only the price
for sorting out. This way, the preference parameter β, capturing the preference for efficiency and equity, is not identified
and predictions are largely uninformative.
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predicted (sets of columns “Details on predictions of . . . ”). In all cases, descriptive and predictive
adequacies are reported for each of the four models discussed so far, payoff-based CES altruism,
the extensions additionally allowing for either warm glow and cold prickle or envy and guilt, and
the welfare-based altruism model. In addition, we report results from a robustness check allowing
for variations in the strength of assignments of endowments, the model “Welfare based (adj)” that
we discuss below. Finally, in the lower part of Table 3, all the numbers in the upper part are
aggregated across all three in-sample data sets to provide the overall picture.
Descriptive adequacy First, we examine the in-sample fit (column “Descriptive Adequacy”).
In aggregate, all generalized models significantly improve on the payoff-based CES model despite
accounting for the additional parameters using AIC. The proposed model of welfare-based altruism
is unique in that it improves highly significantly upon CES in all three contexts and in this sense
represents the only robustly fitting model. Yet, the observation that on aggregate all three models
do so suggests that perhaps they all capture differently important but significant facets of behavior.
If so, this will show in their predictive adequacy.
Predictive adequacy Evaluating robustness of the explanatory power (column “Predictive Ad-
equacy”) changes the picture substantially. Welfare-based altruism improves on CES’ predictions
in all contexts, regardless of the data set used for estimation, and mostly significantly so. That
is, regardless of the context the model is fitted on and of the class of dictator game experiments
to be predicted, the resulting goodness-of-fit is higher than that of the standard CES model, in all
3×4 cases, significantly so in 9/12 cases, and always on aggregate.15 The explanatory power of
reference dependence in giving may therefore be considered robust.
At the other extreme, extending CES altruism by warm glow and cold prickle predicts be-
havior better than CES in only 3/12 cases but worse than CES in 9/12 cases. On aggregate,
its predictions are significantly worse than CES, and this obtains although warm glow and cold
prickle seem to capture behavior (in-sample) in the case of generalized endowments best. This ap-
plies only in-sample, however, even predictions for the other experiments allowing for generalized
endowments fit worse than CES (and all other models), suggesting that the extension allowing for
warm glow and cold prickle does not capture a robust behavioral trait in the games analyzed here.
Finally, the extension allowing for envy and guilt (“inequity aversion”) is in-between with
respect to its descriptive and predictive adequacy. While it fits worse than welfare-based altruism
in all contexts, both in-sample and out-of-sample, at least it does not overfit on aggregate and
thereby it improves on warm glow and cold prickle. That is, on aggregate, accounting for envy
and guilt does not yield predictions that are significantly worse than not doing so (as in the standard
CES model). Nonetheless, predictions also do not improve on aggregate, suggesting that envy and
guilt are actually not robust behavioral traits in giving—they allow to rationalize Leontief choices,
but those are not robustly chosen.16 Corroborating this observation, if we evaluate predictions
15Note that, as mentioned in the notes to all tables and in the appendix, we use the Schennach-Wilhelm likelihood ratio
test throughout (Schennach and Wilhelm, 2016), clustered at the subject level. It is robust to misspecification of models,
arbitrary nesting structures, and captures the panel character of the data with multiple observations per subject.
16In particular in the games with generalized (non-zero) endowments, the payoff-equalizing “Leontief” option happens
to be rarely chosen (Korenok et al., 2013). For example, only 2/116 subjects in KMR14 are strict Leontief types, whereas
around 20% of the subjects are in standard dictator games (see AM02). In this context, predictions assuming that envy and
guilt are behavioral factors fit poorly.
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across all 4×3 cases, inequity aversion’s predictions significantly improve on CES in 2/12 cases,
it predicts significantly worse in 4/12 cases, and overall, its predictive adequacy is slightly worse





Result 2. Welfare-based altruism improves on CES altruism for all types of DG experiments,
both descriptively (in-sample) and robustly (out-of-sample) highly significantly. None of the
benchmark models does so in more than 2/12 cases, corroborating the theoretical prediction
that reference dependence is a causal factor in giving across contexts.
Table 3 additionally informs on a robustness check accounting for the variation in language
used assigning endowments (Table 4 in the appendix). In this robustness check, we allow for
homogeneous shifts in weights between experiments, by introducing a free parameter per set of
predictions. Assuming the in-sample estimates of the weights are (w1,w2), we allow the out-of-




2), where the shift γ≥ 0 is homogeneous for all subjects. With γ< 1 all
weights increase and with γ> 1 all weights decrease—reflecting stronger and weaker assignments,
respectively. Introducing γ as a free parameter allows us to either strengthen or weaken weights
homogeneously for all subjects. Naturally, this has no effect in-sample, but it has substantial effects
out-of-sample—amounting to around 1000 points on the log-likelihood scale in total (yielding a
drop from 26674.4 to 25740.4). This improvement is highly significant given the low number
of additional parameters used, strongly underlining the initial hypothesis that the language used
in experimental instructions is highly relevant in shaping behavior. The present analysis is not
suited nor intended to fully clarify the relevance of language used assigning endowments, but
changes in language across experiments, which have not been explicitly discussed in the literature
on generalized dictator games, are evidently not innocent choices in experimental design. This
does not directly affect the above results, since acknowledging language differences as a factor
shaping reference points only strengthens the case for welfare-based altruism, but such differences
may be acknowledged more explicitly when designing and analyzing future experiments.
5.4 Relation to social norms and “social appropriateness”
Starting with Krupka and Weber (2013), a growing literature relates giving observed in experi-
ments to norm compliance. Subjects are assumed to have a common understanding of the “social
appropriateness” of options, which in turn affects dictator behavior and is a function of the social
norms applying in a given context. In a novel experimental design, Krupka and Weber measure so-
cial appropriateness by having (third) subjects play a coordination game—asking each subject how
“socially appropriate” the available options are in the eyes of their co-players and paying a prize
to all subjects picking the modal response. The mean of all appropriateness ratings is mapped into
a measure sx ∈ [−1,1] for all options x, with sx = −1 indicating highly inappropriate and sx = 1
indicating highly appropriate options. Krupka and Weber then examine if a utility function of the
form
ux = πx +αsx (4)
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fits behavior observed in earlier dictator game experiments, using the weight α as a free parameter.
While statistical tests supporting the results are not provided, the plots in Krupka and Weber (2013)
suggest a good fit after calibrating α. This finding has been interpreted as indicating that behavior
is norm-guided, rather than being payoff or welfare concerned as assumed in earlier work. In
the following, we clarify the relation of our findings to those of Krupka and Weber (2013) and
subsequent work, to discuss how we may think of welfare-based altruism as a foundation of norm-
guided giving.
To this end, let us recap two main results. Krupka and Weber convincingly demonstrate that
experimental subjects are able to predict behavior in taking and sorting games, a feat that existing
behavioral models struggled to achieve. We have shown that welfare-based altruism also allows
to predict behavior, and hence our conjecture: the two are likely to correlate. A post-hoc straight-
forward approach would be to take our predictions of utility ux across options, the respectively
induced payoffs πx, and to then compute social appropriateness sx by inverting Eq. (4) for all op-
tions x. We skip this fairly unintelligible exercise and evaluate whether social appropriateness may
be deduced from first principles.
Krupka and Weber (2013) interpret social appropriateness as reflecting the social norm that
dictators facing a specific dictator game trade off with their self-interest. They argue that since
their elicitation method (i) makes uninvolved subjects rate actions rather than outcomes and (ii)
incentivizes subjects to rate in accordance with what they regard as a socially shared assessment,
the resulting appropriateness ratings satisfy the two main characteristics of a social norm as de-
fined by Elster (1989). These defining features of social norms are closely related to the “social
contract” of Rawls (1971), which specifies a standard for social and distributive justice that “free
and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position
of equality” (p. 11). The idea is that the members of a society would unanimously agree to the
social contract if they met behind the “veil of ignorance”, a hypothetical place where they are
unaware of their positions in society (see also Konow, 2003). According to Rawls (1971) the so-
cial contract emerging in such a situation would prescribe a distribution that equalizes individual
welfares unless inequality is to the advantage of the individual with the minimum welfare. While
for obvious reasons an experimental test of Rawls hypothesis can never be perfect, Krupka and
Weber’s subjects share some central characteristics with Rawls’ society members behind the veil
of ignorance. They can be thought of as impartial since they are uninvolved while they are part
of the same society as the involved players. Furthermore, they are incentivized to find an agree-
ment instead of simply voicing their opinions. Therefore, looking at Krupka and Weber’s social
appropriateness ratings through the lense of our welfare-based altruism model allows us to test the
Rawlsian hypothesis of social welfare being the minimum of all individual welfares, joint with
the assertion that social appropriateness simply transforms social welfare to a scale ranging from
highly inappropriate (−1) to highly appropriate (1).
Since our welfare-based approach directly builds on individual welfares v1 and v2, we are
able to directly test the asserted Rawlsian link between appropriateness and welfares—simply by
predicting individual welfares for all options in the sorting and taking games analyzed by Krupka
and Weber, taking the minimum of v1 and v2 across options, and rescaling such that a measure
ranging from −1 to +1 results. Specifically, we predict the social appropriateness ratings for both
taking and sorting games analyzed by Krupka and Weber based on our estimates from each of
28
Figure 3: Relation of experimentally measured “social appropriateness” (Krupka and Weber) to
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(c) Correlation between observed and predicted appropriateness
Sorting games Taking games
Predictions based on . . . Spearman-ρ p-value Spearman-ρ p-value
Dictator games (AM02) 0.641 (0.001) 0.738 (0)
Gen endowments (KMR13) 0.667 (0.001) 0.766 (0)
Taking games (KMR14) 0.644 (0.001) 0.751 (0)
Note: The “sorting games” compare appropriateness in a standard dictator game with endowments of 10 for the dictator
and 0 for the recipient to appropriateness in a sorting game where the dictator game is succeeded by giving the dictator the
option to sort out at costs of 1. The “taking games” compare appropriateness in a standard dictator game with endowments
of 10 for the dictator and 5 for the recipient to appropriateness in a taking game where the dictator game may alternatively
take one currency unit from the recipient’s endowment. The plots follow Krupka and Weber: solid lines represent the social
appropriateness in the standard dictator games and dashed lines represent social appropriateness in the sorting and taking
games, respectively. The single “dot” in the sorting games reflects the appropriateness of sorting out.
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the three experiments analyzed before (AM02, MKR13, and KMR14). This yields 3× 2 profiles
of appropriateness ratings, which we then relate to the measurements of Krupka and Weber.17
The results are reported in Figure 3 and strongly corroborate the relation of social appropriate-
ness and Rawlsian welfare asserted already by Krupka and Weber. The correlation between the
out-of-sample predictions and the in-sample measurements of Krupka and Weber is very high,
around 0.65 in sorting games and around 0.75 in taking games, regardless of the data set which the





Result 3. Krupka and Weber’s measure of social appropriateness strongly correlates with the
Rawlsian notion of welfare, based on out-of-sample predictions of individual welfares derived
from the above model of welfare-based altruism.
That is, social appropriateness is founded in welfare concerns in the intuitive Rawlsian man-
ner alluded to by Krupka and Weber. It seems futile to ask which came first, welfare concerns
or social appropriateness/social norms, they rather appear to be two sides of the same coin. The
received interpretation that giving reflects context-dependent social norms rather than more funda-
mental payoff and welfare concerns seems premature, but so would the opposite. From a practical
point of view, both approaches seem to have distinctive strengths. Analyses relating behavior to
social appropriateness need not be concerned with individual preferences and can focus on the pic-
ture at large. In turn, the behavioral foundation in welfare concerns has an independent axiomatic
foundation in established behavioral principles, which greatly facilitates application across con-
texts, and the implied S-shape of individual welfares has been observed in many contexts, which
promises reliable predictions and policy recommendations out-of-sample.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the efforts in reorganizing models of the interdependence of preferences
(List, 2009; Malmendier et al., 2014) that was initiated by a wave of generalized dictator game
experiments allowing for non-trivial endowments (Bolton and Katok, 1998; Korenok et al., 2013),
taking options (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008), and sorting options (Dana et al., 2006; Lazear et al.,
2012). The new observations were interpreted as being incompatible with observations from stan-
dard dictator games and in the existing literature a plethora of approaches have been proposed
to capture them: menu dependent preferences and cold prickle to capture taking decisions, warm
glow and social norms to capture endowment effects, image concerns and social pressure to capture
sorting decisions. Considering this range of proposals simply to organize observations on giving
under complete information, robustly applicable models of this most fundamental of economic
activities appear to be out of reach (Korenok et al., 2014)—illustrating a surprisingly tight bound
on economic modeling. However, following our basic intuition, we suspected that this apparent
17Specifically, for each subject in our in-sample experiments (AM02, KMR13, KMR14), we determine the individual
welfares if that subject would play either role, v1 and v2. We then assume that an impartial observer in the sense of Krupka
and Weber determines appropriateness as follows: Across dictators, what is their average individual welfare from choosing
x conditional on choosing x in the first place. Across recipients, what is their average individual welfare from getting x
conditionally on being confronted with x in the first place (which is an empty condition, stated only for symmetry). The
lesser of these conditional expectations is the unscaled Rawlsian appropriateness of each option, and rescaling to [−1,1]
across options yields our out-of-sample prediction for Krupka-Weber appropriateness.
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incompatibility can be resolved once we acknowledge non-convexity and reference dependence of
preferences—as known from choice under risk.
We propose a model that entails exactly this, following an analysis that differs from earlier
work in four important ways. First, we start with an axiomatic foundation based on which we
characterize a general family of utility representations capturing interdependence of preferences.
This identifies the class of candidate models. Second, we complement the theoretical analysis
by a comprehensive econometric analysis of model validity across nine laboratory experiments
to provide a rigorous, objective assessment of model adequacy. Third, as a technical innovation
in the axiomatic derivation, we formally distinguish contexts, which allows us to formalize the
notion of narrow bracketing as a property of preferences, and thus to establish a formally tight but
ex-ante unsuspected link between four large literatures in behavioral economics: prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), narrow bracketing (Read et al., 1999), altruism (Andreoni and
Miller, 2002), and reference dependence (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006). Finally, our results reconcile
a wide range of seemingly inconsistent experimental results with approaches and results from
classical decision theory.
Implicitly, instead of constructing a utility functional that fits as many stylized facts as pos-
sible, we derive a utility representation from established behavioral principles such as scaling
invariance and narrow bracketing. The theoretical predictions about behavior in generalized dic-
tator games, the tight relations to four major branches of behavioral economics, and the fact that
welfare-based altruism directly formalizes the widespread notion that altruism is a concern for
the welfare of others, while being derived from universal behavioral axioms not related to altru-
ism or dictator games, renders this a promising model for future work. Our econometric results
on in-sample and out-of-sample adequacy provide validity in this respect, and both the model’s
generality and its quantitative adequacy open up a number of exciting avenues for future research.
These include experimental analyses of preferences and reference points, based on an ax-
iomatically solid and econometrically validated model, theoretical analyses of utility representa-
tions under alternative axioms and of revealed preference with non-convexities (see also Halevy
et al., 2017), empirical and theoretical analyses of behavioral welfare and preference laundering,18
and, exploiting the relation to choice under risk, behavioral analyses of giving under incomplete
information (as in Dana et al., 2007, and Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009) or in multilateral in-
teractions. Due to the large extent of similarity of charitable giving and dictator behavior in the
laboratory (Konow, 2010; Huck and Rasul, 2011; DellaVigna et al., 2012), a particularly immedi-
ate range of applications lies in structural analyses of charitable giving (DellaVigna, 2009; Card
et al., 2011) generalizing, for example, the work of DellaVigna et al. (2012, 2016) and Huck et al.
(2015).
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Kőszegi, B. and Rabin, M. (2007). Reference-dependent risk attitudes. American Economic Re-
view, 97(4):1047–1073.
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A Relegated proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Step 1 Existence of a continuous, additively separable utility representation.
Axioms 1–2 imply existence of a continuous utility representation (see e.g. Rubinstein, 2012,
chap. 4). In addition Axiom 3 implies existence of an additively separable utility representation,
see Theorem III.4.1 in Wakker (1989) for each context π ∈ Π. That is, there exists a family of











for all x′ ∈ X ,π ∈ Π. For later reference, Wakker’s Theorem III.4.1 also establishes that all addi-
tively separable representations ũπ of %π are positive affine transformations of one another. Also
note that the representations obtained so far may be context dependent.
Step 2 Context independent (vi) by narrow or broad bracketing.
We show that additionally assuming either Axiom 5 or Axiom 6 implies that there exists a family
















represent %π for all π ∈ Π.
Narrow bracketing: Fix any π ∈ Π, any x ∈ X . We show that if the preferences obey Axioms
1-3 and Axiom 6, then they admit the claimed representation for any function r : Π → Rn with
r(π′) = π′(x)− π(x) for all π′ ∈ Π. Fix this r and any π′ ∈ Π. By Assumption 1.1, r(π′) =
π′(x′)− π(x′) for all x′ ∈ X . Also note r(π) = 0. By narrow bracketing, we know that %π is


























for all x,y ∈ X . Since π(x) = π′(x)− ri(π




























for all x,y ∈ X . Since this holds true for all π′ ∈ Π, the claim is established using vi = vπ,i for all
i ≤ n. Note again that u (and thus v) is unique up to positive affine transformation, and that for any
π′, if π′ = π+ c, then r(π′) = r(π+ c) = r(π)+ c by construction.
Broad bracketing: For each context π, fix value functions (vπ,i) representing %π as obtained
in Step 1. By broad bracketing, value functions (ṽπ)π∈Π representing preferences exist such that
for all x,x′ ∈ X and all π,π′ ∈ Π,














Given any such family (ṽπ,i), and using P = ∪π∈Ππ[X ], define the functions {vi : P → R}i≤n such
that for all p ∈ P,
vi(pi) = ṽπ,i(πi(x)) for some (π,x) : p = π(x).
Adequate (π,x) exist for all p ∈ P by construction of P. By broad bracketing, this implies
vi(pi) = ṽπ,i(πi(x)) for all (π,x) : p = π(x),
thus establishing that (vi) allow to represent the preferences as claimed. Since all (ṽπ,i) must be
positive affine transformations of (vπ,i), which are continuous, both (ṽπ,i) and (vi) also are families
of continuous functions.
Step 3 Normalize (vi,ri) in relation to π
0.

















i.e. such that ri(π
0) = 0 for all i ≤ n. Again, by r(π)+ c = r(π+ c) for all c ∈ Rn, this implies
r(π) = c if π = π0 + c, for all π ∈ Π. Note that given this translation, we can analyze narrow
bracketing and broad bracketing in a uniform manner when focusing on π0 (i.e. we do not have to
include ri as ri(π
0) = 0).
Step 4 Using scaling invariance to fix the functional form.
By Axiom 4, preferences in context π0 are scaling invariant. That is, for all λ > 0, define uλπ0 :








for all λ,x, and we obtain
uλπ0(x)≥ uλπ0(y)⇔ uπ0(x)≥ uπ0(y) ⇔ π
0(x)%π0 π
0(y). (10)
By aforementioned Theorem III.4.1 of Wakker (1989) this implies that uλπ0 is a positive affine












for all i ∈ N, x ∈ X , λ > 0. Now, define X+i = {x ∈ X |π
0
i (x)> 0} as well as λ̃ = logλ, ṽi : R→ R
such that ṽi(log p) = vi(p) for all p > 0, and π̃
0
i (x) = logπ
0
i (x) for all x ∈ X
+










By continuity of vi we obtain continuity of ṽi, and since the payoff image π
0[X ] is a cone in Rn
with all dimensions being essential, it has positive volume in Rn, i.e. π0i [X ] is an interval of positive
length for all dimensions i. Hence, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 of Aczél (1966, p. 150) imply that









= α · eβπ̃
0
i (x)+ γ
with α 6= 0 and β,γ being arbitrary constants, and inverting the variable substitutions,
vi(π
0
i (x)) = α · logπ
0
i (x)+ γ or vi(π
0





To distinguish the constants from constants in other dimensions, we rewrite
vi(π
0






i (x) or vi(π
0






for all x ∈ X+i . Next, define X
−
i = {x ∈ X |π
0
i (x) < 0}, and apply the same line of arguments to
−π0i (x) for all x ∈ X
−
i , which yields
vi(π
0
















for all x ∈ X−i , again with α
−




i being arbitrary constants.
Step 5 Using continuity and Eq. (11) to normalize the parameters.
In the following, we refer to the two possible forms of the value function vi as power form and
logarithmic form (in the obvious manner). By continuity, the logarithmic form is feasible only if
πi(x)> 0 for all x ∈ X , implying that the second branch is never taken. Hence, for all i ≤ n and all
x ∈ X ,
vi(π
0









and we can set α+i = 0 for all i by applying a positive affine transformation (recalling that the
value functions are unique up to positive affine transformation). This establishes the claim for the
logarithmic form in context π0, noting that α+i and β
+
i are switched (for the logarithmic form) in
the formulation of the proposition for notational convenience.
Regarding the power form of the value function, rescaling payoffs we obtain
∀x ∈ X+i : vi(λπ
0



























i + γ−i ,
which is compatible with Eq. (11) only if β+i = β
−




i = γi for all i. Given the latter,
we can again set γ+i = γ
−
i = 0 by a positive affine transformation. As a result, the claim for both
the logarithmic form and the power form is established for context π0.
Step 6 Extension to contexts π 6= π0.








represents %π with vi as characterized in the previous step and ri as characterized in Steps 2 and
3. Since the representation is unique up to positive affine transformation, we can add arbitrary
constants, and the claim is established for any context π ∈ Π.
Broad bracketing: By Step 2, the utility representation characterized in Step 5 applies uni-
formly to all contexts.
A.2 Proofs of Propositions 2 and 3
A.2.1 Optimal choice of a regular dictator ∆ in a given game Γ with P1 = [0,B]
Note that since for this part of the proof the game Γ is kept fixed, we drop the game index on
the utility function and write ri instead of ri(Γ) for the reference points. Then dictator ∆’s utility







β if p1 ≥ r1
−δ(r1 − p1)








β if p2(p1)≥ r2
−δ(r2 − p2(p1))
β if p2(p1)< r2
}
where p2(p1) = t(B− p1).
Step 1 Dictator ∆ never chooses p1 such that p1 < r1 and p2(p1)< r2.
By satisfiability of reference points and P1 = [0,B] dictator ∆ can always choose p1 ∈ P1 such
that p1 ≥ r1 and p2(p1)≥ r2. This yields utility u(p1) = (p1 − r1)
β/β+α(t(B− p1)− r2)
β/β ≥ 0
where the inequality follows by weak efficiency concerns (0 < β < 1). Choosing p′1 ∈ P1 such that
p′1 < r1 and p2(p
′
1)< r2 instead yields utility u(p
′
1) =−δ(r1 − p1)
β/β−αδ(r2 − t(B− p1))
β/β <
0.
Thus, we can restrict attention to the regions where at most one of the two players is in the
loss-domain, i.e. does not reach her reference point. In the following we will first determine the
local optima for dictator ∆ in each of the three remaining regions. Then we can determine the
global optimum by comparing utilities of the local optima.
Step 2 Local optimum in region 1: p1 ∈ [r1,B−
1
t
r2] (⇔ p1 ≥ r1 and p2(p1)≥ r2)
The utility function that applies is
u(1)(p1) = (p1 − r1)
β +α · (t(B− p1)− r2)
β
Differentiating u(1) with respect to p1 we get
du(1)
d p1
= β(p1 − r1)
β−1 −αβ t (t (B− p1)− r2)
β−1
which yields the first order condition
(p1 − r1)












B+ cα r1 − r2/t
cα +1
and p+2 (Γ) =
tcα (B− r1)+ r2
cα +1
using cα := (α t
β)
1
1−β . Note that for p1 = B−
1
t
r2 and p1 = r1 the above first order condition is not





iff satisfiability is binding, i.e. B− r1 −
1
t
r2 = 0. By satisfiability we have p
+









which is fulfilled for p+1 (Γ) by satisfiability, weak efficiency concerns (0 < β < 1), and α, t > 0.






Step 3 Local optimum in region 2: p1 ∈ (B−
1
t
r2,B] (⇔ p1 ≥ r1 and p2 < r2)
The utility function that applies is
u(2)(p1) = (p1 − r1)
β −δα · (r2 − t(B− p1))
β
Differentiating u(2) with respect to p1 we obtain
du(2)
d p1
= β(p1 − r1)
β−1 −δαβt (r2 − t (B− p1))
β−1
which yields the first order condition
(p1 − r1)

















































1−β cα < 1, the second order condition for p
(2)






1−β (t(B− r1)− r2)
β < 0.
Thus, the second order condition does not hold for any p
(2)
1 (Γ) ∈ (B−
1
t
r2,B] by satisfiability and


















































Step 4 Local optimum in region 3: p1 ∈ [0,r1) (⇔ p1 < r1 and p2(p1)≥ r2)
A-5
The utility function that applies is
u(3)(p1) =−δ · (r1 − p1)
β +α · (t(B− p1)− r2)
β
Differentiating u(3) with respect to p1 we obtain
du(3)
d p1
= δβ(r1 − p1)
β−1 −αβt(t(B− p1)− r2)
β−1


























By satisfiability we have p
(3)









. The second order
condition for p
(3)













which by satisfiability does not hold for any p
(3)
1 (Γ) ∈ [0,r1). It follows that the optimum is either
p1 = 0 or p1 = r1 depending on whether u








































Step 5 Reducing the set of candidate solutions for the global optimum




and u(p+1 (Γ)) ≥ u(r1) for all regular dictators ∆, a result which obtains by simple rearrangement
of the two inequalities. Thus, the remaining candidate solutions for the overall utility maximizer
are p1 = p
+
1 (Γ), p1 = B, and p1 = 0.
















From weak efficiency concerns (0 < β < 1) we can conclude that
c
1−β
α < (cα +1)
1−β .
Define f (x) = xβ, then weak efficiency concerns (0 < β < 1) imply that f is subadditive in the




−1 and b = 1, we have


























α ≤ 1. In this case we can conclude that the lower bound for δ defined in (13) is lower
or equal 1, which by weak loss aversion (δ ≥ 1) implies u(p+1 (Γ))≥ u(0). Note that c
1−β
α ≤ 1 by
weak altruism (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) always holds under no efficiency gains from giving (t ≤ 1) such that
in this case the candidate solutions for the overall utility maximizer reduce further to p1 = p
+
1 (Γ)
and p1 = B.




















α > 1. In this case by a similar argument as above we can conclude that the lower
bound for δ defined in (14) is lower or equal 1, which by weak loss aversion (δ ≥ 1) implies
u(p+1 (Γ)) ≥ u(B). We can therefore conclude that under efficiency gains from giving (t > 1) the
candidate solutions for the overall utility maximizer reduce to p1 = p
+
1 (Γ) and p1 = B in case
c
1−β
α ≤ 1 while they reduce to p1 = p
+
1 (Γ) and p1 = 0 in case c
1−β
α > 1.
Step 6 Global optimum
For the global optimum we have to distinguish the following two cases:
















































Note that under no efficiency gains from giving (t ≤ 1) only case 1 applies.
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A.2.2 Establishing the comparative statics
Step 1 Non-convexity In any game Γ with P1 = [0,B] there are dictators with non-convex pref-
erences.









We have shown in step 3 of A.2.1 that the utility function of this dictator attains a minimum at
p1 = p
(2)
1 (Γ) ∈ [B− r2/t,B] and has no other local extrema in that region. Furthermore, we have
shown in step 2 of A.2.1 that her utility function attains a maximum at p1 = p
+
1 (Γ) ∈ [r1,B− r2/t]
and has no other local extrema in that region. Consider options a and b with pa1 = B and p
b
1 =









for dictator ∆ in game Γ there exists an option d with pd1 ∈ (p
+













1). Since uΓ represents dictator ∆’s preferences in game
Γ, this implies that her preferences are non-convex.
We still have to show that in any game Γ with P1 = [0,B] there exist regular dictators with
δ ≤ δ̄(Γ). For any transfer rate t specified by Γ we can find (α,β) satisfying 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and
0 < β < 1 such that c
1−β
α ≤ 1 ⇔ c
β−1
α ≥ 1. Given such (α,β), for any endowments (B1,B2)
specified by Γ, we can find (w1,w2) in accordance with satisfiability resulting in reference points
r1(Γ) = w1B1+w2B2 and r2(Γ) = t(w1B2+w2B1) such that r2(Γ)/t(B−r1(Γ)) is close enough to
1 to make δ̄(Γ)≥ 1. Thus, given such (α,β,w1,w2), we can conclude that there exist δ satisfying
weak loss aversion (δ ≥ 1) such that δ ≤ δ̄(Γ).
Step 2 Taking options reduce giving both at the extensive and intensive margin Introducing
a taking option turns some initial givers into takers and reduces average amounts given.
Consider two games Γ= 〈B1,B2,P1, t〉 and Γ
′ = 〈B1,B2,P
′
1, t〉 with B2 > 0 that are equivalent
in every dimension except the choice set of the dictator. In Γ the choice set is restricted to P1 =
[0,max p1] with max p1 = B1 and in Γ
′ the choice set is extended to p′1 = [0,max p
′
1] with B1 <
max p′1 ≤ B1 +B2.
Moving from Γ to Γ′ the only game parameter that changes is the maximum payoff for the
dictator which rises from max p1 = B1 to max p
′
1. As a result of this rise, the minimum payoff
for the recipient adjusts accordingly, i.e. it falls from min p2 = t(B1 + B2 − max p1) = tB2 to
min p′2 = t(B1 +B2 −max p
′
1). Therefore, the utility functions of a regular dictator ∆ in Γ and Γ
′
differ in the players’ reference points. We have





r1(Γ) = (w1 −w2)B1 +w2 max p1 with
dr1
d max p1
= w2 ≥ 0,
where the inequalities follow from satisfiability. Thus, we have r2(Γ)≥ r2(Γ
′) and r1(Γ)≤ r1(Γ
′).
Plugging in our reference points we get for the interior solution in game Γ
















furthermore, that by satisfiability
d p+1
d max p1
≤ 1 implying that the interior solution is feasible for any
regular dictator in Γ and Γ′.
In A.2.1. we specified the global optimum for games like Γ with P1 = [0,B]. In games like
Γ′ where the choice set of the dictator is restricted to P′1 = [0,max p1] with max p1 < B the selfish
corner solution p1 = B is not feasible. Thus, we have for c
1−β
α ≤ 1 (case 1):
p∗1 =
{









t(max p1 − r1)






r2 − t(B−max p1)
)β
)
where the expression for δ̂+(Γ) follows from rearrangement of uΓ(p
+
1 (Γ)) ≥ uΓ(max p1). Note
that for c
1−β
α > 1 (case 2) the specification of the global optimum is not affected by the restriction
of the choice set because the altruistic corner solution p1 = 0 is feasible in Γ
′.
We consider this threshold δ̂+(Γ′) such that in game Γ′ among the regular dictators with
c
1−β
α ≤ 1, those with δ < δ̂
+(Γ′) choose the selfish corner solution p1 = max p
′
1 while those with
δ ≥ δ̂+(Γ′) choose the interior solution p1 = p
+
1 (Γ








1 − (w1 −w2)B1
w1 max p
′







1 − (w1 −w2)B1
w1 max p
′











































From weak altruism, weak efficiency concerns, satisfiability, and w1 ≥ w2 we can conclude that
dδ̂+
d max p′1
≥ 0. Thus, we have δ̂+(Γ) ≤ δ̂+(Γ′), implying that weakly more regular dictators with
c
1−β
α ≤ 1 prefer the selfish corner solution to the interior solution in Γ
′ compared to Γ.
Now, consider the threshold δ−(Γ) such that in game Γ among the regular dictators with
c
1−β
α > 1, those with δ < δ
−(Γ) prefer the altruistic corner solution p1 = 0 while those with δ ≥
δ−(Γ) prefer the interior solution p1 = p
+





(1−w1)max p1 +(w1 −w2)B1





(1−w1)max p1 +(w1 −w2)B1
















(1−w1)max p1 +(w1 −w2)B1





(1−w1)max p1 +(w1 −w2)B1





From weak altruism, weak efficiency concerns, satisfiability, and w1 ≥ w2 we can conclude that
dδ−
d max p1
≤ 0. Thus, we have δ−(Γ) ≥ δ−(Γ′) implying that weakly less regular dictators with
c
1−β
α > 1 prefer the altruistic corner solution to the interior solution in Γ
′ compared to Γ.
Using these results together with our results from A.2.1 we can show that comparing the
A-9
choice of any regular dictator ∆ in Γ to her choice in Γ′ one of the following cases applies:
(i) Her choice switches from p1 = p
+
1 (Γ) to p1 = p
+
1 (Γ




(ii) Her choice switches from p1 = p
+




1 (Γ)< max p
′
1.
(iii) Her choice switches from p1 = 0 to p1 = p
+
1 (Γ
′) where 0 ≤ p+1 (Γ
′).
(iv) Her choice remains at p1 = 0.
First, we restrict attention to regular dictators with c
1−β
α ≤ 1. Note that in game Γ by satis-
fiability r2(Γ) ≤ B2 such that there is no feasible choice for the dictator in which the recipient’s
reference point is not fulfilled. Thus, in game Γ these dictators all choose the interior solution
p1 = p
+
1 (Γ). Now consider the same dictators in Γ
′ and split them into two groups according
to their loss aversion parameters. The dictators with δ ≥ δ̂+(Γ′) choose p1 = p
+
1 (Γ
′) in Γ′. The




Now, restrict attention to regular dictators with c
1−β
α > 1. We split these dictators into three
groups according to their loss aversion parameters. Consider first the dictators with δ ≥ δ−(Γ).
These dictators choose p1 = p
+
1 (Γ) in Γ. Since δ




Second, consider the dictators with δ ∈ [δ−(Γ′),δ−(Γ)). These dictators choose p1 = 0 in Γ and
switch to p1 = p
+
1 (Γ
′) in Γ′. Third, consider the dictators with δ < δ+(Γ′). These dictators choose
p1 = 0 both in Γ and in Γ
′.
We still have to show that for any Γ and Γ′ there exist regular dictators who give in Γ and
switch to taking in Γ′. We show that for any Γ and Γ′ there exist regular dictators with p+1 (Γ)< B1
and δ < δ̂+(Γ′), i.e. regular dictators who give at the interior solution in Γ and to whom case
(ii) applies. We have p+1 (Γ) < B1 iff cα(1−w1)+w2 > 0. Thus, we have p
+
1 (Γ) < B1 for all
regular dictators with 0 < w1 < 1 or w1 = 1 and w2 > 0. Now, for any transfer rate t specified
by Γ and Γ′ we can find (α,β) satisfying 0 < α ≤ 1 and 0 < β < 1 such that c
1−β
α < 1 ⇔ c
β−1
α >
1. Given such (α,β), for any endowments and choice set (B1,B2,P
′




1 − (w1 −w2)B1)/(w1 max p
′
1 − (w1 −w2)B1) = 1 for w1 = 1 and w2 = 0. Thus,
by continuity of δ̂+ we can always find w1 > 0 and w2 ≥ 0 in accordance with satisfiability such
that the expression is close enough to 1 to make δ̂+(Γ′)> 1 and given such (α,β,w1,w2), we can
conclude that there exist δ satisfying weak loss aversion (δ ≥ 1) such that δ < δ̂+(Γ′).
Finally, we need to show that for any Γ and Γ′ there exist regular dictators who give more in Γ




δ ≥ δ̂+(Γ′). As above we have p+1 (Γ)< B1 for all regular dictators with 0 < w1 < 1 or w1 = 1 and
w2 > 0. Furthermore, we have
d p+1
d max p1
= 0 for w1 = 1 and w2 = 0. Thus, by continuity of p
+
1 (Γ)
for any transfer rate t specified by Γ and Γ′ we can find 0 < w1 ≤ 1 and w2 ≥ 0 in accordance
with satisfiability such that p+1 (Γ) < p
+
1 (Γ
′) < B1. Since there is no upper bound on the loss
aversion parameter of regular dictators given such (w1,w2) there always exist regular dictators
with δ ≥ δ̂+(Γ′).
Step 3 Incomplete crowding out Reallocating initial endowment from dictator to recipient re-
sults (in expectation) in a payoff increase for the recipient.





1, t〉 without taking option, i.e.





′ is generated from Γ by reallocating initial endowment from




2 = B̄ and B1 < B
′
1. Thus, comparing such
games we can write the recipient’s endowment as a function of the dictator’s endowment, i.e.
B2(B1) = B̄−B1.
Moving from Γ to Γ′ the game parameters that change are the player’s endowments and
the maximum payoff for the dictator. The dictator’s endowment falls from B1 to B
′
1 while the
recipient’s endowment rises from B̄−B1 to B̄−B
′
1. Furthermore, the maximum payoff for the
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dictator falls from B1 to B
′
1 such that the minimum payoff for the recipient rises from min p2 =




1). Therefore, the utility functions of a regular dictator ∆ in Γ and Γ
′
differ in the reference points of the dictator and the recipient. We have
r1(Γ) = w1B1 with
dr1
dB1
= w1 ≥ 0,
where the inequality follows from satisfiability, and




where the inequality follows from satisfiability and t > 0. Thus, we have r1(Γ) ≥ r1(Γ
′) and
r2(Γ)≤ r2(Γ












where the inequality follows from imperfect altruism, weak efficiency concerns, and satisfiability.




Consider now the threshold for δ−(Γ) such that in game Γ among the regular dictators with
c
1−β
α > 1, those with δ < δ
−(Γ) choose the altruistic corner solution p1 = 0 while those with
δ ≥ δ−(Γ) choose the interior solution p1 = p
+















and since the threshold is independent of B1 we get
dδ−
dB1
= 0. Thus, we have δ−(Γ) = δ−(Γ′) =: δ−.
Using these results together with our results from A.2.1 we can show that comparing the
choice of any regular dictator ∆ in Γ to her choice in Γ′ one of the following cases applies:
(i) Her choice switches from p1 = p
+
1 (Γ) to p1 = p
+
1 (Γ




(ii) Her choice remains at p1 = 0.
Consider first only regular dictators with c
1−β
α ≤ 1. Since in neither Γ nor Γ
′ there is a feasible
choice such that the reference point of the recipient is not fulfilled, these dictators all choose the
respective interior solution in Γ and Γ′.
Now, consider regular dictators with c
1−β
α > 1. We split these dictators into two groups ac-
cording to their loss aversion parameters. Consider first the dictators with δ ≥ δ−. These dictators
choose p1 = p
+
1 (Γ) in Γ and p1 = p
+
1 (Γ
′) in Γ′. Second, consider the dictators with δ < δ−. These
dictators choose p1 = 0 both in Γ and Γ
′.
Finally, we show that for any Γ and Γ′ there exist regular dictators to whom case (i) applies in
a strict sense, i.e. regular dictators whose choice in Γ′ compared to Γ strictly increases the payoff
of the recipient. For any transfer rate t specified by Γ and Γ′ we can find α > 0 and β satisfying
weak altruism and weak efficiency concerns such that c
1−β
α ≤ 1, i.e. for any transfer rate t we can
find regular dictators to whom case (i) applies. Furthermore, given such (α,β) we can always find
(w1,w2) in accordance with satisfiability such that d p
+
1 /dB1 > 0.
Step 4 Efficiency concerns The recipient’s payoff is weakly increasing in the transfer rate.
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Consider two games Γ = 〈B1,B2,P1, t〉 and Γ
′ = 〈B1,B2,P1, t
′〉 with t < t ′, P1 = [0,max p1],
and B1 ≤ max p1 ≤ B1 +B2 which are equivalent in every dimension except the transfer rate.
The utility functions of a regular dictator ∆ in Γ and Γ′ differ only in the reference points of
the recipient. His endowment is multiplied with t ′ instead of t and his minimal payoff increases
from min p2 = t(B−max p1) to min p
′
2 = t
′(B−max p1). We have




= B2 +(1−w1 +w2)B1 − (1−w1)max p1 ≥ 0
where the inequality follows by satisfiability and max p1 ≤ B1+B2. Thus, we have r2(Γ)≤ r2(Γ
′).
We can rewrite the interior solution as
p+1 (Γ) =













(r1(Γ)− (1−w1)max p1 − (w1 −w2)B1) =
tcαβ
1−β
(w1 +w2 −1)max p1 ≤ 0
where the inequality follows from weak altruism, weak efficiency concerns, and satisfiability.




Consider now the threshold δ̂+(Γ) such that in a game Γ with max p1 > B1 among the regular
dictators with c
1−β
α ≤ 1, those with δ< δ̂
+(Γ) choose the selfish corner solution p1 =max p1 while
those with δ ≥ δ̂+(Γ) choose the interior solution p1 = p
+






max p1 − r1










max p1 − r1

















max p1 − r1





max p1 − r1




where the inequality follows from weak altruism, weak efficiency concerns, and satisfiability.
Thus, we have δ̂+(Γ)≥ δ̂+(Γ′), implying that weakly more regular dictators with c
1−β
α ≤ 1 choose
the selfish corner solution in Γ compared to Γ′.
Consider now the threshold δ−(Γ) such that in game Γ among the regular dictators with
αtβ > 1, those with δ < δ−(Γ) choose the altruistic corner solution p1 = 0 while those with δ ≥
δ−(Γ) choose the interior solution p1 = p
+
1 (Γ). We can rewrite this threshold as
δ−(Γ) = αtβ
(













































Thus, we have δ−(Γ)≤ δ−(Γ′), implying that weakly more regular dictators with αtβ > 1 choose
the altruistic corner solution in Γ′ compared to Γ.
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Step 5 Reluctant sharers When an outside option is introduced, some initial givers switch to
that option while the behavior of dictators who sort into the game stays unaffected.
Consider two games Γ = 〈B1,B2,P1, t〉 and Γ
′ = 〈B1,B2,P
′
1, t〉 with B1 > 0, B2 = 0, P1 =
[0,B1], and P
′
1 = {[0,B1], p̃1} where 0.5B1 < p̃1 ≤ B1, i.e. game Γ
′ is generated from game Γ by
adding an outside option to the choice set of the dictator.
Since the two games differ only in the choice set of the dictator, which is equivalent in both
games except for the extra outside option in game Γ′, the utility functions of a regular dictator
in Γ and Γ′ are equivalent where the two choice sets overlap. Furthermore, since the dictator’s
information is not manipulated by the choice of the outside option, her reference point stays the
same for the choice of the outside option. We have r1(Γ) = r1(Γ
′) =: r1 with r1 = w1B1. However,
since the outside option leaves the recipient completely uninformed about the choice of the dictator
and the rules of the game, his reference point is zero for the outside option choice. We thus have
for the reference point of the recipient r2(Γ) = r2(Γ
′) =: r2 with
r2 =
{
tw2B1 if p1 ∈ [0,B1]
0 if p1 = p̃1










β if p̃1 < w1B1.
Since as noted above the utility functions of a regular dictator in Γ and Γ′ are equivalent for
p1 ∈ [0,B1] we have p
+
1 (Γ) = p
+
1 (Γ























Note first, that no regular dictator with w1 > p̃1/B1 chooses the outside option. By satis-
fiability, such a dictator can always choose p1 ∈ [0,B1] such that p1 ≥ r1 and p2(p1) ≥ r2. This
yields utility u(p1) = (p1−r1)
β/β+α(t(B1− p1)−r2)
β/β≥ 0, where the inequality follows from
weak efficiency concerns. Choosing p′1 = p̃1 instead yields u(p̃1) = −δ(w1B1 − p̃1)
β < 0. In the
following we restrict attention to dictators with w1 ≤ p̃1/B1. We have u(p
+








We show that for any Γ and Γ′ there exist regular dictators with δ ≥ δ+ and p̃min1 < p̃1,
i.e. regular dictators who choose the interior solution in Γ and the outside option in Γ′. For any
transfer rate t specified by Γ and Γ′ we can find (α,β) satisfying weak altruism and weak efficiency
concerns such that c
1−β
α ≤ 1. Given such (α,β), for any dictator endowment B1 specified by Γ and
Γ′ and any outside option payment p̃1 specified by Γ
′ we have p̃min1 = 0.5B1 for w1 = w2 = 0.5.
Thus, by continuity of p̃min1 we can for any Γ and Γ
′ find (w1,w2) in accordance with satisfiability
such that p̃min1 < B1. Since there is no upper bound on the loss aversion parameter of regular
dictators, given such (w1,w2) there always exist regular dictators with δ ≥ δ
+.
Step 6 Social pressure givers Ceteris paribus, higher susceptibility to social pressure implies
higher recipient payoffs at the interior solution but also a higher propensity to choose the outside
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option in a sorting game.
Higher susceptibility to social pressure corresponds to a higher weight on the opponent’s











β B1 ≤ 0
where the inequalities follow from weak altruism and weak efficiency concerns.
B Details of the econometric specification
Technical details We estimate all parameters by maximum likelihood, and each case, the like-
lihood is maximized by a combination of two algorithms: first, using the robust (gradient-free)
NEWUOA algorithm (Powell, 2006; Auger et al., 2009), secondly a Newton-Raphson method to
ensure convergence. In addition, we cross-test globality of the maxima using a large number of
informed starting values. These starting values are derived from estimates for related models on
the same data set or from the same model on other data sets. Since we estimated the same model
on many different data sets and related models on the same data sets, we were able to generate
many informed starting vectors helpful in examining globality of maxima via cross-testing. As
is well-known from numerical non-linear maximization (see e.g. McCullough and Vinod, 2003),
generating informed starting values is necessary to ensure global optimality, and it proved ex-
tremely helpful also in our case. We stopped cross-testing and generating new starting values once
the estimates had converged across all optimization problems simultaneously, based on which we
conclude that we approximated the global maxima.
We evaluate significance of differences between models using the Schennach-Wilhelm like-
lihood ratio test (Schennach and Wilhelm, 2016). This test is robust to both misspecification and
arbitrary nesting of models, which is required to allow for the possibility that all models are mis-
specified and to acknowledge that the nesting structure at least out-of-sample is not necessarily
well-defined. In addition, the Schennach-Wilhelm test allows us cluster at the subject level and to
thus account for the panel character of the data. We indicate significance of differences between
models distinguishing the conventional level of 0.05 and the higher level of 0.01, which roughly
implements the Bonferroni correction given four types of dictator game experiments we examine.
As many other experiments involving choice of numbers, responses in dictator games exhibit
pronounced round-number patterns. We control for those using the focal choice adjusted logit
model, exactly as derived and applied in Breitmoser (2017). The basic idea is that the roundedness
of the number to be entered (to choose a given option) determine its “relative focality”, which
is captured by a focality index φ : X → R. The idea that focality is a choice-relevant attribute
of options next to utility follows from Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), and given standard axioms
including positivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and narrow bracketing, this implies a






This approach effectively captures round-number effects in stochastic choice, and in turn, simply
ignoring the round-number effects as pronounced as in Dictator games was shown to yield sub-
stantially biased results in Breitmoser (2017).19 To avoid spending any degree of freedom here,
19For example, in the experiment of Korenok et al. (2014), subjects mostly picked multiples of five, typically from
option sets ranging from 0 to 20. The most pronounced interior mass points are at choosing payoffs of 10 for both, dictator
and recipient. Estimating the reference points of subjects in this experiments without controlling for round number effects
yields estimates of reference point 10 each, and in this case, the reference point simply helps to capture the round-number
effect. Controlling for the round-number effects, the overall model fit improves drastically and less round-number inspired
reference points (deviating from 10 each) are estimated.
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we use the same focality index as Breitmoser (2017)20 and set κ equal to 0.8. Robustness checks
on both choices are reported in Appendix C.
Capturing heterogeneity One of the more robust finding in behavioral economics is that sub-
jects differ: They have heterogeneous preferences and differing precision in maximizing their
preferences, and in addition, we suspect, they also have idiosyncratic reference points. Across
subjects, these behavioral primitives are likely correlated. For example, a negative exponent β in
the CES utility function implies a flat utility function, and thus to maintain “average precision” in
maximizing utility a larger logit-parameter λ is required. Hence, β and λ generally are negatively
correlated. For a related observation in the context of risk aversion, see for example Wilcox (2008).
The correlation structure itself is unknown, however, and in addition, functional form assumptions
about the marginal distributions of parameters seem to be equally difficult to make in the present
context. We have only little knowledge about the distribution of individual preferences in gener-
alized dictator games, except that the altruism weight α is likely truncated at say (−0.5,0.5), and
that the exponent β does not seem to comply with a simple continuous distribution (for example,
Andreoni and Miller, 2002, estimate that some subjects have linear preferences with β close to 1,
some have Cobb-Douglas with β ≈ 0, and others are Leontief with β →−∞).
While somewhat adequate approximations exist for each of these issues, we chose to tackle
heterogeneity in a non-parametric manner attempting to combine the strengths of continuous dis-
tributions (“random coefficients”) and the generality of finite-mixture models (see e.g. McLachlan
and Peel, 2004). In a first step, we estimate for each subject the model parameters (preferences α,β,
precision λ, and reference point weights w1,w2) individually by maximum likelihood.
21 Then, for
the predictions that most of our results rely on, we implement a finite mixture approach where
each of the n subjects available in-sample has weight 1/n out-of-sample. That is, we model the
out-of-sample subject pool to be characterized as a finite mixture of n components, each with prior
weight 1/n, where each component corresponds with one subject from the in-sample data set. For
illustration, there are 106 subjects in KMR14. The in-sample estimation yields 106 parameter vec-
tors denoted as (p1, p2, . . .). This means that the prediction for the other experiments is that with
probability 1/106 a subject has vector p1, with probability 1/106 vector p2 applies, and so on.
The main advantage of this approach that it allows us to capture distributions of parameters
and their correlations without parametric assumptions. Any single parameter estimate is somewhat
noisy, obviously, but since maximum likelihood estimates are approximately normally distributed,
the errors overall cancel out and we obtain a fairly general description of the joint distribution of the
individual parameters. The observed reliability of our out-of-sample predictions corroborates this
approach. Finally, the approach is equally applicable to all models, also to the models accounting
for say warm glow and cold prickle, or envy and guilt, and in this way it allows for an equally
general treatment of heterogeneity across models.
Finally, to adjust for the differences in budgets between experiments and the (potential) dif-
ferences in the weights of round numbers resulting from the differences in options sets, we allow
all individual precision parameters λ and the round-number weight κ to be adjusted jointly across
subjects when making predictions between experiments. These two scaling parameters are es-
timated from the data, but this rescaling is applied equally for all models and does therefore not
affect the relative ranking. The likelihood-ratio tests of predictive adequacy also follow Schennach
and Wilhelm (2016) as described above.
20That is, multiples of 100 have focality level φx = 4, other multiples of 50 have level 3, other multiples of 10 have level
2, other multiples of 5 have level 1, other integers have level 0, other multiples of 0.5 have level −1 and so on. The results
are invariant to positive affine transformations of φ, i.e. shifting the level of or scaling φ does not affect the results.
21For numerical reasons, this step is split up into two substeps. First, we estimate individual preference and precision
parameters for all reference point weights satisfying w1 ≥ w2 on a grid of step-size 0.1. Secondly, we determine for each
individual the likelihood maximizing reference point weights, taking the “smallest” reference point weights in cases of
non-uniqueness (non-uniqueness occurs mainly for subjects consistently maximizing their pecuniary payoffs).
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Table 4: Instructions differ in the declaration and strength of assignment of endowments
Experiment Instructions Classification
AM02 “[...] you are asked to make a series of choices about how to divide a set of tokens
between yourself and one other subject in the room.”
neutral
HJ06 “[...] you are asked to make a series of choices about how to divide points between
yourself and one other subject in the other room”
neutral
CHST07 “[...] you must decide how you want to divide the joint production between yourself
and your opponent. In the example above the contributions of the two players to the
joint production are 800 NOK and 200 NOK, respectively.”
loaded
KMR12 “The blue player has to decide how much of $Y, a fixed amount of money, to pass to the
green player and how much to keep for himself/herself. [...] In addition to the money
passed by the blue player, the green player will also earn $X.”
loaded
KMR13 “Blue will be asked to make a series of 18 choices about how to divide a set of tokens
between herself and the Green player. [...] Each choice that Blue makes is similar to the
following: Green has 15 points. Divide 50 tokens: HOLD [blank] @ 1 point(s) each,
and PASS [blank] @ 2 point(s) each.”
neutral (dictator)
loaded (recipient)
List07 “Everyone in Room A and in Room B has been allocated $5. The person in Room
A (YOU) has been provisionally allocated an additional $5. Participants in Room B
have not been allocated this additional $5.[...] decide what portion, if any, of this $5 to
transfer to the person you are paired with in Room B. You can also transfer a negative
amount: i.e., you can take up to $1 from the person in Room B.”
loaded
Bard08 “Each of you has been given £6. [...] You can either leave payments unchanged, increase
your own, by decreasing the other person’s payment, or decrease your own, increasing
the other person’s payment.”
loaded
KMR14 “In different scenarios you will decide what portion of your endowment to transfer to
another participant in the room. Each scenario specifies how much money is in your
endowment, how much money is in the OTHER endowment and the range of allowable
transfers. In some scenarios you can also transfer a negative amount: i.e., you can take
some of the OTHER endowment.”
loaded
LMW12 “You will have to decide how to distribute e10 between yourself and the person.” neutral
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C Robustness checks in the econometric analysis
The purpose of this section is to show that the results are highly robust to variations in the three
econometric assumptions: functional form for reference points (Assumption 3), relative focality
of the numbers that may be entered (Footnote 20), extent of round-number effects (κ = 0.8 in Eq.
(15)).
Result 4 (Summary of the robustness checks).
• We examine four different specifications clarifying how reference points change across con-
texts (see Definitions 3–5). In line with the theoretical prediction that welfare-based al-
truism improves model adequacy for all reference point specifications, both descriptive and
predictive adequacy (in-sample and out-of-sample) improve highly significantly for all spec-
ifications. See Table 5, panel “Aggregate”.
• We examine two alternative specifications for factoring out round-number effects, the results
are very similar for all specifications as shown. See Tables 6 and 7 in comparison to Table
5.
• Throughout, we allow for non-linear inequity aversion as third benchmark model to extend
payoff-based CES altruism. This extension fits substantially worse than the standard linear
one examined above and hence was not reported in the paper. See the lines “+ Inequity
Aversion (nonl)” in all the tables referenced above.
C.1 Definitions
For clarity, we first repeat the (deliberately simplistic) base model from the main text.
Definition 3 (Welfare-based altruism (base model)). In game Γ = 〈B1,B2,P1, t〉, using w1,w2 ∈
[0,1],
r1(Γ) = w1 ·B1 +w2 · tB2
r2(Γ) = w2 ·B1 +w1 · tB2.
Our second robustness check is a model similar to Definition 3, but other endowments are
weighed by transfer rate. This implicitly yields inequity averse reference points for w1 = w2
(scaled down or up if w1 + w2 ≷ 1). It is equivalent to Definition 3 if t = 1. By comparing
it to Definition 3, we can evaluate if subjects take the transfer rate into account when forming
reference points. Notable special cases are CES (w1 = w2 = 0), and inequity aversion/egalitarian
(w1 = w2 = 0.5), strict libertarian ref points (w1 = 1,w2 = 0). Obviously, the model allows for a
continuum in-between.
Definition 4 (Welfare-based altruism 2 (robustness check I)). In game Γ = 〈B1,B2,P1, t〉, using
w1,w2 ∈ [0,1],
r1(Γ) = w1 ·B1 +w2 ·B2
r2(Γ) = w2 · tB1 +w1 · tB2.
Our second robustness check adapts the base model in Definition 3 by allowing for the back-
ground income to equate with the minimal payoff, rather than the outside-laboratory payoff.
Definition 5 (Welfare-based altruism 3 (robustness check II)). In game Γ = 〈B1,B2,P1, t〉, using
w1,w2 ∈ [0,1],
r1(Γ) = min p1 +w1 · (B1 −min p1)+w2 · (tB2 −min p2)
r2(Γ) = min p2 +w2 · (B1 −min p1)+w1 · (tB2 −min p2).
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Our final robustness check is the arguably most realistic model used in the theoretical analy-
sis, weighing by transfer rate and using the minimal payoff as background income. This model usu-
ally fits best. It contains status-quo-based reference points (w1 = w2 = 0) and strict expectations-
based reference points (w1 + w2 = 1) as the most notable special cases, and by allowing for
w1 +w2 ∈ (0,1) all convex combinations are also included.
Definition 6 (Welfare-based altruism 4 (robustness check III)). In game Γ = 〈B1,B2,P1, t〉, using
w1,w2 ∈ [0,1],
r1(Γ) = min p1 +w1 · (B1 −min p1)+w2 · (B2 −min p2/t),
r2(Γ) = min p2 +w2 · t · (B1 −min p1)+w1 · (t ·B2 −min p2).
As non-linear model of inequity aversion, we use the following straightforward extension of
CES altruism.
Definition 7 (Non-linear inequity aversion). Using the notation in the main text, non-linear in-
equity aversion is defined as follows:




2 −α2 · |π1 −π2|
β
+−α3 · |π2 −π1|
β
+.
(+ Inequity Aversion (nonl))
Finally, as simplified focality weights as robustness check for the standard focality weights
described above (Footnote 20, which follows Breitmoser (2017)), we use the following.
Definition 8 (Simplified focality weights). All numbers that are multiples of 5 have focality weight
φ = 1 in Eq. (15), all other numbers have focality weight φ = 0.
C.2 Results
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Table 5: Predictions for standard focality weights and κ = 0.8 (results from main text)
Descriptive Predictive Details on predictions of . . .
Calibrated on Altruism is . . . Adequacy Adequacy Dictator Endowments Taking Sorting
Aggregate Payoff based (CES) 5839.8 27404.1 9343.1 9631.8 5546.8 2882.4
+ Warm Glow/Cold Prickle 5354.6++ 28075−− 9896.5−− 9581.6 5617.8− 2979.1−−
+ Inequity Aversion 5453.9++ 27447.9 9094+ 9859.8−− 5600.4−− 2893.7
+ Inequity Aversion (nonl) 5718.2+ 27435 9196.1 9811.9−− 5546.4 2880.6
Welfare based 5035.7++ 26674.4++ 9093.2++ 9385++ 5451++ 2745.2++
Welfare based (adj) 5035.7++ 25740.4++ 8883.6++ 9023.5++ 5212.2++ 2631.2++
Welfare based 2 5181.4++ 26919.5++ 9108.6++ 9529.5 5473.3+ 2808.2++
Welfare based 2 (adj) 5181.4++ 26209++ 8852.9++ 9179.9++ 5393.2++ 2793++
Welfare based 3 5048.4++ 27064.9+ 9221.4 9640.7 5494.5+ 2708.2++
Welfare based 3 (adj) 5048.4++ 25920++ 8559.7++ 9306.4++ 5393.2++ 2670.7++
Welfare based 4 4936.9++ 26945++ 9308.3 9354.1++ 5493.6+ 2789++
Welfare based 4 (adj) 4936.9++ 25703.9++ 8594.5++ 9167.1++ 5286.7++ 2665.6++
Dictator games Payoff based (CES) 1460.9 8950.5 1343.4 4339 2353.3 914.7
+ Warm Glow/Cold Prickle 1507.3−− 8854.6 1343 4218.4+ 2375.2 917.9
+ Inequity Aversion 1234.6++ 8794.8++ 1217.1+ 4311.7 2360.7 905.3
+ Inequity Aversion (nonl) 1314.9++ 8943.8 1271.4++ 4391.2−− 2357.8 923.3
Welfare based 1146.6++ 8758++ 1279.8+ 4273.8+ 2316.6+ 887.7
Welfare based (adj) 1146.6++ 8603.9++ 1263.9+ 4152.5++ 2300.8++ 888.2
Welfare based 2 1146.4++ 8849.2+ 1276.4+ 4355.8 2325+ 892+
Welfare based 2 (adj) 1146.4++ 8585.3++ 1265.7+ 4119.5++ 2309.7++ 892+
Welfare based 3 1055++ 8818.4+ 1272.6+ 4336.7 2321.5+ 887.5+
Welfare based 3 (adj) 1055++ 8673.6++ 1255.2+ 4231.6 2307.8+ 880.5+
Welfare based 4 1050.9++ 8715.2++ 1268.8+ 4240.1++ 2324.2 882.1++
Welfare based 4 (adj) 1050.9++ 8662.1++ 1252.5+ 4219.8++ 2309.4+ 881.9++
Gen Endowments Payoff based (CES) 2896.6 8752.9 4260.4 826.1 2613.8 1052.7
+ Warm Glow/Cold Prickle 2395.5++ 8967.8−− 4289.6 954.5−− 2649.7 1074
+ Inequity Aversion 2800.1+ 8916.4−− 4333.6− 849.9 2663−− 1069.9−−
+ Inequity Aversion (nonl) 2923.3 8703.6+ 4235.2 824.5 2599.8+ 1044++
Welfare based 2662.7++ 8416.7++ 4084.2++ 767.9+ 2565.9+ 998.7++
Welfare based (adj) 2662.7++ 7867.7++ 3985.8++ 637.1++ 2351++ 895.4++
Welfare based 2 2769.6++ 8615.1++ 4157.7+ 819.4 2580.2 1057.8
Welfare based 2 (adj) 2769.6++ 8312.5++ 3995.9++ 751.5++ 2521.6++ 1045.1
Welfare based 3 2730++ 8626.1++ 4236.6 822.1 2606.2 961.2++
Welfare based 3 (adj) 2730++ 7928.2++ 3692.7++ 778.5+ 2524.5++ 934++
Welfare based 4 2662.7++ 8754.3 4319.1− 782 2601.1 1052
Welfare based 4 (adj) 2662.7++ 7710.2++ 3719.7++ 643.3++ 2413.4++ 935.2++
Taking Games Payoff-based (CES) 1482.4 9700.7 3739.3 4466.7 579.7 914.9
+ Warm Glow/Cold Prickle 1451.8 10252.5−− 4263.8−− 4408.7 592.8 987.2−−
+ Inequity Aversion 1419.2+ 9736.7 3543.3++ 4698.2−− 576.6 918.5
+ Inequity Aversion (nonl) 1479.9 9787.7 3689.5 4596.1−− 588.8− 913.3
Welfare-based 1226.4++ 9499.7+ 3729.2 4343.2 568.5+ 858.8++
Welfare based (adj) 1226.4++ 9270.3++ 3633+ 4232.9++ 559.3++ 846.6++
Welfare-based 2 1265.5++ 9455.3++ 3674.5 4354.2+ 568.2 858.3++
Welfare based 2 (adj) 1265.5++ 9310.1++ 3590.4+ 4305.4++ 560.9+ 854.9++
Welfare-based 3 1263.4++ 9620.4 3712.2 4482 566.9 859.4++
Welfare based 3 (adj) 1263.4++ 9312.1++ 3603.2+ 4295.4+ 559.8+ 855.2++
Welfare-based 4 1223.4++ 9475.5++ 3720.4 4332+ 568.2+ 855++
Welfare based 4 (adj) 1223.4++ 9331.8++ 3620.6 4302.4+ 562.9++ 847.5++
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Table 6: Predictions for simplified focality weights and κ = 0.8 (robustness check)
Descriptive Predictive Details on predictions of . . .
Calibrated on Altruism is . . . Adequacy Adequacy Dictator Endowments Taking Sorting
Aggregate Payoff based (CES) 5968.4 27868.5 10084.1 9676.9 5277.3 2830.1
+ Warm Glow/Cold Prickle 5546.9++ 28922.2−− 10687−− 9846.6− 5428−− 2960.7−−
+ Inequity Aversion 5593.9++ 27994.9 9944 9772.7 5377.8−− 2900.4−−
+ Inequity Aversion (nonl) 6128.5−− 28905.7−− 10752.5−− 9827−− 5353.9−− 2972.4−−
Welfare based 4677.3++ 27288.5++ 9790.8++ 9560.8 5232.4+ 2704.5++
Welfare based (adj) 4677.3++ 26308.2++ 9618.3++ 9107.8++ 5000.7++ 2591.4++
Welfare based 2 5023.7++ 26894.6++ 9920.8+ 8986.9++ 5275.3 2711.6++
Welfare based 2 (adj) 5023.7++ 26240.1++ 9659.8++ 8759++ 5148+ 2683.3++
Welfare based 3 5258++ 27031.7++ 9843.9++ 9180.6++ 5270.6 2736.6++
Welfare based 3 (adj) 5258++ 26174.3++ 9591.9++ 8875.1++ 5133.9+ 2583.4++
Welfare based 4 5258++ 26772.1++ 9733.1++ 9174.7++ 5202.5+ 2661.8++
Welfare based 4 (adj) 5258++ 25472.9++ 8880++ 8933.2++ 5088.7++ 2581++
Dictator games Payoff based (CES) 1697.2 8998.3 1462.4 4387.3 2253.5 895.1
+ Warm Glow/Cold Prickle 1715.9 9104.6−− 1502.8−− 4377.3 2304−− 920.4−
+ Inequity Aversion 1390.2++ 8834.1+ 1352+ 4313.9 2268.5 899.7
+ Inequity Aversion (nonl) 1753−− 9117.8−− 1484.9− 4418.9 2295.4−− 918.6−
Welfare based 1392++ 8807.9++ 1396.7++ 4335.2 2208.4++ 867.5
Welfare based (adj) 1392++ 8473.5++ 1349.4++ 4080++ 2184.7++ 861+
Welfare based 2 1400.9++ 8757.5++ 1442.9 4170.8++ 2258 885.9
Welfare based 2 (adj) 1400.9++ 8654.1++ 1437 4090.9++ 2248.6 879.1
Welfare based 3 1392.3++ 8801++ 1391.2++ 4266++ 2270.1 873.7
Welfare based 3 (adj) 1392.3++ 8548.6++ 1348.2++ 4071.4++ 2263.4 867.1+
Welfare based 4 1392.7++ 8707.2++ 1360.6+ 4234.8+ 2257.3 854.4
Welfare based 4 (adj) 1392.7++ 8529.2++ 1356.5+ 4093.5++ 2241.9 838.8+
Gen Endowments Payoff based (CES) 2870.3 8828.2 4503 840.8 2441.2 1043.2
+ Warm Glow/Cold Prickle 2438.7++ 9018.4−− 4518.8 936.9−− 2500.4−− 1062.4
+ Inequity Aversion 2837.6 9057.8−− 4650.6−− 841.7 2504.8−− 1060.6−
+ Inequity Aversion (nonl) 2926.5−− 9003.2−− 4609.8−− 871.4−− 2453.2 1068.8−−
Welfare based 2149.8++ 8650.6++ 4372.5++ 836.2 2448.7 993.1+
Welfare based (adj) 2149.8++ 8159.9++ 4308.6++ 703.3++ 2250.8++ 898.8++
Welfare based 2 2387++ 8763.2 4561.1 767++ 2443.9 991.2+
Welfare based 2 (adj) 2387++ 8321.2++ 4347.6+ 676.6++ 2329.4+ 969.1++
Welfare based 3 2636.8++ 8763.8 4544 762.5++ 2427.8 1029.4
Welfare based 3 (adj) 2636.8++ 8216++ 4362.4++ 673++ 2299.8++ 882.2++
Welfare based 4 2586.3++ 8494.9++ 4401++ 774.9++ 2366++ 953+
Welfare based 4 (adj) 2586.3++ 7618.3++ 3757.5++ 696.4++ 2275.2++ 890.7++
Taking Games Payoff-based (CES) 1400.9 10041.9 4118.7 4448.7 582.6 891.9
+ Warm Glow/Cold Prickle 1392.3 10799.2−− 4665.4−− 4532.4− 623.5−− 977.9−−
+ Inequity Aversion 1366.1+ 10103 3941.3+ 4617−− 604.6−− 940.1−−
+ Inequity Aversion (nonl) 1448.9−− 10784.7−− 4657.8−− 4536.7−− 605.3−− 985−−
Welfare-based 1135.5++ 9830+ 4021.5 4389.4 575.2 843.9+
Welfare based (adj) 1135.5++ 9676.3++ 3959.4++ 4323.5+ 564.2++ 830.7++
Welfare-based 2 1235.8++ 9374++ 3916.9++ 4049.1++ 573.4 834.6++
Welfare based 2 (adj) 1235.8++ 9266.3++ 3874.2++ 3990.5++ 569+ 834.1++
Welfare-based 3 1228.9++ 9466.8++ 3908.7++ 4152.1++ 572.7 833.4++
Welfare based 3 (adj) 1228.9++ 9411.2++ 3880.3++ 4129.7++ 569.6+ 833++
Welfare-based 4 1279.1++ 9569.9++ 3971.4 4164.9++ 579.1 854.4
Welfare based 4 (adj) 1279.1++ 9326.9++ 3765.1++ 4142.3++ 570.5 850.5+
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Table 7: Predictions for standard focality weights and κ = 0.6 (robustness check)
Descriptive Predictive Details on predictions of . . .
Calibrated on Altruism is . . . Adequacy Adequacy Dictator Endowments Taking Sorting
Aggregate Payoff based (CES) 5858.5 27706.5 9385.7 9895.7 5561.1 2864.1
+ Warm Glow/Cold Prickle 5385.4++ 28483.9−− 10056.6−− 9809.1 5639− 2979.2−−
+ Inequity Aversion 5458.5++ 27412.6+ 9048+ 9844.8 5636.8−− 2882.9
+ Inequity Aversion (nonl) 5703.4++ 27412.1+ 9166.5+ 9824.5 5548.6 2872.5
Welfare based 5030.7++ 26719++ 9156.4+ 9359.3++ 5480.2+ 2723.1++
Welfare based (adj) 5030.7++ 25647.1++ 8894.5++ 8962.8++ 5193.7++ 2606.1++
Welfare based 2 5175.3++ 27115++ 9350.9 9488.8++ 5487.3+ 2788++
Welfare based 2 (adj) 5175.3++ 26237.4++ 9054++ 9037.9++ 5402.6++ 2752.8++
Welfare based 3 5015.1++ 26985.5++ 9207.2 9573.8+ 5505.2 2699.3++
Welfare based 3 (adj) 5015.1++ 25725.8++ 8509.8++ 9191.6++ 5401.6++ 2632.9++
Welfare based 4 4927.3++ 26759.6++ 9189.9 9334.5++ 5527 2708.2++
Welfare based 4 (adj) 4927.3++ 25558++ 8503.9++ 9130.5++ 5279.5++ 2654.1++
Dictator games Payoff based (CES) 1493.5 9087.2 1374.2 4442.4 2370.4 900.3
+ Warm Glow/Cold Prickle 1533 9012.6 1369.2 4355.5+ 2378 910
+ Inequity Aversion 1238.4++ 8835.5++ 1204.7++ 4341.1+ 2386.6 903
+ Inequity Aversion (nonl) 1326.8++ 8999.9 1245.1++ 4472.8 2366.4 915.6−
Welfare based 1165.2++ 8725.1++ 1278++ 4256.8++ 2317.2+ 873.1
Welfare based (adj) 1165.2++ 8486.5++ 1235.9++ 4077.4++ 2302.2++ 872.4
Welfare based 2 1168.9++ 8738.7++ 1285.8++ 4245.4++ 2334.2+ 873.3
Welfare based 2 (adj) 1168.9++ 8580.8++ 1256++ 4133.4++ 2321.1+ 871.8+
Welfare based 3 1066.6++ 8756.4++ 1270.3+ 4286.8+ 2321.5+ 877.7+
Welfare based 3 (adj) 1066.6++ 8556.3++ 1247.2++ 4124.1++ 2310++ 876.4+
Welfare based 4 1066.7++ 8690.2++ 1261.5++ 4225.2++ 2332.5 870.9+
Welfare based 4 (adj) 1066.7++ 8580.2++ 1238.9++ 4161.1++ 2312.8+ 868.9+
Gen Endowments Payoff based (CES) 2867 8696 4197.9 829.2 2613.8 1055.2
+ Warm Glow/Cold Prickle 2383.2++ 9015.5−− 4311.2−− 961.3−− 2668 1075.1
+ Inequity Aversion 2791.6+ 8899.2−− 4291.5−− 855.6 2681.2−− 1070.9−
+ Inequity Aversion (nonl) 2892 8677.4 4249.7 786.3++ 2595.8 1045.7
Welfare based 2631.6++ 8479.8++ 4122.8+ 769.8+ 2586.6 1000.7++
Welfare based (adj) 2631.6++ 7884.6++ 4026++ 640.5++ 2329.2++ 890.3++
Welfare based 2 2731.8++ 8809.8−− 4348.1−− 813.5 2591 1057.2
Welfare based 2 (adj) 2731.8++ 8468.9++ 4154 748.4++ 2522.8++ 1045
Welfare based 3 2673.4++ 8750.8 4315.3−− 848.7 2621.3 965.5++
Welfare based 3 (adj) 2673.4++ 7915.3++ 3677++ 788.2+ 2532.8+ 918.8++
Welfare based 4 2626.2++ 8624.4 4242.4 776.7+ 2618.6 986.7++
Welfare based 4 (adj) 2626.2++ 7705.4++ 3715.2++ 647++ 2403.3++ 941.4++
Taking Games Payoff-based (CES) 1498.1 9923.3 3813.6 4624.1 576.9 908.6
+ Warm Glow/Cold Prickle 1469.1 10455.7−− 4376.2−− 4492.4++ 593− 994.1−−
+ Inequity Aversion 1428.5+ 9677.9++ 3551.8++ 4648.1 568.9+ 909
+ Inequity Aversion (nonl) 1484.7 9734.8+ 3671.7+ 4565.4 586.4− 911.2
Welfare-based 1234++ 9514.1++ 3755.7 4332.7++ 576.5 849.3++
Welfare based (adj) 1234++ 9277.5++ 3631.6++ 4243.8++ 561.3++ 842.4++
Welfare-based 2 1274.6++ 9566.5++ 3717 4429.9++ 562.2 857.5++
Welfare based 2 (adj) 1274.6++ 9187.6++ 3643++ 4153.4++ 557.7+ 835++
Welfare-based 3 1275.1++ 9478.3++ 3621.6++ 4438.3+ 562.3 856.1++
Welfare based 3 (adj) 1275.1++ 9255.1++ 3584.5++ 4278.2++ 557.2+ 836.7++
Welfare-based 4 1234.4++ 9445.1++ 3686 4332.5++ 575.9 850.7++
Welfare based 4 (adj) 1234.4++ 9273.4++ 3548.9++ 4321.1++ 562.2++ 842.8++
A-21
